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Article 
The Fourth Amendment Implications of 
“U.S. Imitation Judges” 
Mary Holper† 
  INTRODUCTION   
John Oliver, in a recent episode entitled “Immigration 
Courts,” shone a spotlight on the numerous problems with how 
U.S. immigration courts operate.1 He refuted a general misun-
derstanding that immigration courts sit in the judicial branch of 
government, rendering critical adjudicative decisions about de-
portation, and explained that they actually are Executive 
Branch employees.2 The boss of immigration judges is the attor-
ney general of the United States, who works for the president.3 
The prosecutor who argues to detain and deport the noncitizen 
also works for the president, as an employee of the Department 
of Homeland Security (DHS).4 The person who jailed the de-
tainee in the first place is yet another DHS employee.5 
 
†  Associate Clinical Professor, Boston College Law School. I am thankful 
for the helpful comments from Daniel Kanstroom, Fatma Marouf, Michael Ka-
gan, Rachel Rosenbloom, Phil Torrey, Jennifer Klein, Timothy Watkins, Bob 
Bloom, Diane Ring, Mary Bilder, Daniel Farbman, Shu-Yi Oei, Natalya Shnit-
ser, Ray Madoff, Michael Cassidy, Mark Spiegel, Catharine Wells, Hiba Hafiz, 
and Ryan Williams. I also would like to thank Andres Santamaria for his re-
search assistance, and Dean Vincent Rougeau for research funding.  
Copyright © 2020 by Mary Holper.  
 1. Immigration Courts: Last Week Tonight with John Oliver (HBO), 
YOUTUBE (Apr. 1, 2018), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9fB0GBwJ2QA 
[https://perma.cc/L3W8-EFHF]. 
 2. Id. 
 3. Id. 
 4. Id.  
 5. Id.  
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Scholars, immigration judges, attorneys, and congressional 
committees have been calling for a truly independent immigra-
tion adjudication system for decades,6 critiquing a system in 
 
 6. See, e.g., Hearing on Strengthening and Reforming America’s Immigra-
tion Court System Before the Subcomm. on Border Sec. & Immigration of the S. 
Judiciary Comm., 115th Cong. (Statement of Judge A. Ashley Tabaddor, Presi-
dent, National Association of Immigration Judges) (2018) [hereinafter State-
ment], https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc04-18-18%20Tabaddor% 
20Testimony.pdf [https://perma.cc/RF4H-JZKF] (discussing the inconsistencies 
of having a judicial court in a law enforcement department); Immigration Re-
form and the Reorganization of Homeland Defense: Hearing before the Sub-
comm. on Immigration of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. 72–73, 85 
(2002) (statement of Dana Marks Keener, President, National Association of 
Immigration Judges), https://govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CHRG-107shrg86931/ 
pdf/CHRG-107shrg86931.pdf [https://perma.cc/MRS7-5U66] (recommending 
the adoption of a 1997 proposal to fix the problems of immigration courts); U.S. 
COMM’N ON IMMIGRATION REFORM, BECOMING AN AMERICAN: IMMIGRATION 
AND IMMIGRATION POLICY (1997), https://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED424310.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/GUS7-YAVL] (making recommendations to Congress on how 
to reform the immigration system); SEC’Y OF LABOR’S COMM. ON ADMIN. PROCE-
DURE, THE IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE 81–82 (mimeo. 1940); 
AM. BAR ASS’N, REFORMING THE IMMIGRATION SYSTEM (2010), https://www 
.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/commission_on_immigration/ 
coi_complete_full_report.authcheckdam.pdf [https://perma.cc/6E3P-QX4H] 
(proposing solutions to the problems with immigration courts); APPLESEED, AS-
SEMBLY LINE INJUSTICE: BLUEPRINT TO REFORM AMERICA’S IMMIGRATION 
COURTS 35 (2009), https://www.appleseednetwork.org/uploads/1/2/4/6/ 
124678621/assembly_line_injustice-_blueprint_to_reform_americas_ 
immigration_courts.pdf [https://perma.cc/VT6K-TT4E] (advocating for impar-
tial immigration judges); JAYA RAMJI-NOGALES ET AL., REFUGEE ROULETTE: 
DISPARITIES IN ASYLUM ADJUDICATION AND PROPOSALS FOR REFORM 12–16 
(2011) (outlining the structure of immigration courts); Lawrence H. Fuchs, Im-
migration Policy and the Rule of Law, 44 U. PITT. L. REV. 433, 439 (1983) (de-
scribing 1981 report of the Select Commission on Immigration and Refugee Pol-
icy, appointed in 1978, which proposed creation of an Article I immigration 
court); Stephen H. Legomsky, Deportation and the War on Independence, 91 
CORNELL L. REV. 369, 372–75 (2006) [hereinafter Legomsky, War on Independ-
ence] (discussing the history of immigration judges); Stephen H. Legomsky, Re-
structuring Immigration Adjudication, 59 DUKE L.J. 1635, 1644–51 (2010) [Le-
gomsky, Restructuring Immigration Adjudication] (detailing the criticisms of 
immigration courts); Dana Leigh Marks, An Urgent Priority: Why Congress 
Should Establish an Article I Immigration Court, 13 BENDER’S IMMIGR. BULL. 
3, 3–4, 10–11 (2008) [hereinafter Leigh Marks, An Urgent Priority] (explaining 
that many problems remain unsolved with respect to immigration courts); Dana 
Leigh Marks, Still a Legal Cinderella? Why the Immigration Courts Remain an 
Ill-Treated Stepchild Today, 59 FED. LAW. 25, 29 (2012) [hereinafter Leigh 
Marks, Still a Legal Cinderella] (showing how immigration courts are im-
portant for all lawyers to understand); Peter J. Levinson, A Specialized Court 
for Immigration Hearings and Appeals, 56 NOTRE DAME LAW. 644, 644–45 
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which some judges describe themselves as “U.S. imitation 
judges.”7 This Article examines the lack of truly independent im-
migration judges (IJs) through the lens of the Fourth Amend-
ment, which applies when a noncitizen is arrested for deporta-
tion.8 In 1975, the Supreme Court held in Gerstein v. Pugh9 that 
to continue detention after an initial arrest in the criminal con-
text, the detached judgment of a neutral judge is necessary; a 
prosecutor’s finding of probable cause is insufficient to protect 
the important Fourth Amendment rights to be free from an un-
reasonable seizure.10 In contrast, in the immigration detention 
context, no such neutral judge has any role in the process. Every 
person who authorizes a noncitizen’s arrest and detention works 
for a law enforcement agency, causing one to wonder who exactly 
is exercising independent judgment over decisions concerning 
noncitizens’ physical freedom.  
 
(1981) (explaining the inefficiencies with dependence on the Immigration and 
Naturalization Service); Will Maslow, Recasting Our Deportation Laws: Pro-
posals for Reform, 56 COLUM. L. REV. 309, 309 (1956) (arguing that the proce-
dures of justified deportation warrant scrutiny); M. Isabel Medina, Judicial Re-
view—A Nice Thing? Article III, Separation of Powers and the Illegal 
Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, 29 CONN. L. 
REV. 1525, 1562 (1997) (proposing an Article I court for immigration law); Den-
ise Noonan Slavin & Dorothy Harbeck, A View from the Bench by the National 
Association of Immigration Judges, 63 FED. LAW. 67, 68 (2016) (explaining how 
a growing caseload, coupled with inconsistent obligations, affects immigration 
courts); Denise Noonan Slavin & Dana Leigh Marks, Conflicting Roles of Immi-
gration Judges: Do You Want Your Case Heard by a “Government Attorney” or 
by a “Judge”?, 16 BENDER’S IMMIGR. BULL. 1785, 1787 (2011) (demonstrating 
the complexities of immigration courts); Maurice A. Roberts, Proposed: A Spe-
cialized Statutory Immigration Court, 18 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1, 7 (1980) (exam-
ining the expanded role of the Immigration and Naturalization Service); Harry 
N. Rosenfield, Necessary Administrative Reforms in the Immigration and Na-
tionality Act of 1952, 27 FORDHAM L. REV. 145, 151 (1958) (“[W]here the consul 
denies, or refuses to issue, a visa, he is a law unto himself, and his action is final 
and cannot be reviewed by any other administrative authority.”); Note, The Spe-
cial Inquiry Officer in Deportation Proceedings, 42 VA. L. REV. 803, 818–25 
(1956) (describing the process of discretionary relief); Press Release, Am. Immi-
gration Lawyers Ass’n, AILA Renews Call for an Independent Immigration 
Court (May 27, 2003) (“AILA urges the creation of an independent immigration 
court system . . . .”).  
 7. Slavin & Harbeck, supra note 6, at 70 (“As one of our colleagues put it, 
we often feel that we are ‘U.S. imitation judges.’”). 
 8. See infra Part II. 
 9. 420 U.S. 103 (1975). 
 10. Id. at 114. 
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This Article builds off of prior scholarship examining the 
Fourth Amendment’s application in the immigration context, in-
troducing a further problem: immigration adjudicators’ lack of 
independence. Christopher Lasch exposed the Fourth Amend-
ment violations inherent in Immigration and Customs Enforce-
ment (ICE) detainer practices,11 which spurred successful 
Fourth Amendment litigation when local governments at-
tempted to hold persons without probable cause pursuant to ICE 
detainers.12 Following the successful detainer litigation, Michael 
Kagan described the practice of warrantless arrests for deporta-
tion without a prompt probable cause hearing by a neutral deci-
sion-maker as “[i]mmigration [l]aw’s [l]ooming Fourth Amend-
ment [p]roblem.”13 Kagan assumed the neutrality of 
immigration judges in his article, focusing instead on the length 
of time before noncitizens receive such review of DHS’s detention 
decisions.14 In a separate article, I have critiqued the detentions 
pursuant to the “shadow” procedures of expedited and adminis-
trative removal as a further Fourth Amendment violation, as 
only DHS officers sign off on detention as part of these proce-
dures.15 Because the decision-makers in shadow deportations 
are DHS actors, not immigration judges, in that piece I do not 
 
 11. Christopher N. Lasch, Enforcing the Limits of the Executive’s Authority 
to Issue Immigration Detainers, 35 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 164, 186–93 (2008) 
(outlining procedural avenues to change ICE issues); Christopher N. Lasch, Lit-
igating Immigration Detainer Issues, in IMMIGRATION LAW FOR THE COLORADO 
PRACTITIONER 34-1 (1st ed., 2011) (pointing out how varying interpretations 
and use of Form I-247 could implicate constitutional safeguards such as proba-
bly cause); Christopher N. Lasch, The Faulty Legal Arguments Behind Immi-
gration Detainers, AM. IMMIGR. COUNCIL, IMMIGR. POL’Y CTR.: PERSPECTIVES 
SERIES, Dec. 2013, at 2, https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/sites/ 
default/files/research/lasch_on_detainers.pdf [https://perma.cc/J27N-EH5G] 
(encouraging jurisdictions to adopt different detainer policies). 
 12. See infra Part II. 
 13. Michael Kagan, Immigration Law’s Looming Fourth Amendment Prob-
lem, 104 GEO. L.J. 125, 126 (2015). 
 14. Id. In a recent article, I also propose prompt probable cause hearings 
before immigration judges, but only for post-entry social control deportations. 
See Mary Holper, Promptly Proving the Need To Detain for Post-Entry Social 
Control Deportation, 52 VAL. U. L. REV. 231, 238 (2018). In this article I only 
briefly question immigration judges’ neutrality without fully exploring the 
Fourth Amendment implications of their lack of neutrality. Id.  
 15. Mary Holper, The Unreasonable Seizures of Shadow Deportations, 86 
U. CIN. L. REV. 923, 932–37 (2018). 
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fully explore the immigration adjudication system’s lack of a 
truly neutral judge.16 
In this Article, I propose that federal magistrate judges 
make such a probable cause finding in order to continue pretrial 
detention for deportation.17 This proposal resolves the Fourth 
Amendment violations that occur when the only supposedly 
“neutral” judge who authorizes the jailing of a human being is 
regularly critiqued as not so “neutral.”18 While others have effec-
tively argued that the entire immigration adjudication system 
needs a judge who is untethered from a law enforcement 
agency,19 in this Article, I focus only on the initial decision to 
continue pretrial detention, as this is where, in the criminal pre-
trial context, the Fourth Amendment’s probable cause hearing 
requirement attaches.  
The need for a neutral decision-maker in immigration de-
tention decisions has never been more important. The Trump 
administration has promoted an unabashedly anti-immigrant 
agenda, resolving to detain and deport as many immigration vi-
olators as possible20 and promising to end the “catch and release” 
program that candidate Trump referred to as a “massive am-
nesty.”21 The administration has kept its promises, going so far 
as announcing a “zero tolerance” policy of taking children away 
from asylum-seekers who illegally cross the U.S. border to deter 
 
 16. See id. at 940–43. 
 17. See infra Part I.A.1. 
 18. See infra Part II. 
 19. See, e.g., APPLESEED, supra note 6, at 7; Legomsky, War on Independ-
ence, supra note 6, at 385. 
 20. See, e.g., Border Security and Immigration Enforcement Improvements, 
Exec. Order No. 13,767, 82 Fed. Reg. 8793 (Jan. 25, 2017) [hereinafter Border 
Security Executive Order], https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2017/ 
01/25/executive-order-border-security-and-immigration-enforcement 
-improvements [https://perma.cc/8KCB-UGTK] (increasing detention powers); 
Memorandum from John Kelly, Sec’y of Homeland Sec., Implementing Presi-
dent’s Border Security and Immigration Enforcement Improvements Policies 
(Feb. 20, 2017) [hereinafter Border Security Implementation Memo], https:// 
www.dhs.gov/publication/implementing-presidents-border-security-and 
-immigration-enforcement-improvement-policies [https://perma.cc/W7RQ 
-N5DJ] (putting the executive order into practice). 
 21. Donald J. Trump, Remarks at Luedecke Arena in Austin, Texas (Aug. 
23, 2016). 
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future border-crossers.22 Only after massive national and inter-
national outcry did President Trump reverse the policy.23 In fis-
cal year 2017, the ICE agency within DHS jailed a daily average 
of nearly 40,500 people.24 By May 2019, reports show a stagger-
ing 52,000 people in ICE detention.25 The ICE Enforcement and 
Removal Operations made a total of 143,470 arrests in FY 2017, 
a thirty percent rise from FY 2016.26 In FY 2018 ICE increased 
that arrest number by eleven percent, arresting 158,581 peo-
ple.27  
Then-Attorney General Jeff Sessions in 2017 announced 
that the administration “will secure this border and bring the 
full weight of both the immigration courts and federal criminal 
enforcement to combat this attack on our national security and 
 
 22. See Eli Rosenberg, Senator Asks FBI for Perjury Investigation of 
Kirstjen Nielson over Family Separation Statements, WASH. POST (Jan. 18, 
2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2019/01/18/senator-asks-fbi 
-perjury-investigation-kirstjen-nielsen-over-family-separation-statements/ 
?noredirect=on&utm_term=.03495885e6a0 [https://perma.cc/D4SB-QAB5] (dis-
cussing recently leaked DHS Memo regarding family separation policy with link 
to memo). 
 23. See John Wagner et al., Trump Reverses Course, Signs Order Ending 
His Policy of Separating Families at the Border, WASH. POST (June 20, 2018), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/powerpost/gop-leaders-voice-hope-that-bill 
-addressing-family-separations-will-pass-thursday/2018/06/20/cc79db9a-7480 
-11e8-b4b7-308400242c2e_story.html?noredirect=on&utm_term= 
.ddaaebcc4d25 [https://perma.cc/GW97-UDCC] (referring to the “[i]nternational 
condemnation of the Trump administration policy” as one source of the change 
in policy).  
 24. NAT’L IMMIGRANT JUSTICE CTR. & DET. WATCH NETWORK, ICE LIES: 
PUBLIC DECEPTION, PRIVATE PROFIT 2 (2018), http://immigrantjustice.org/sites/ 
default/files/content-type/research-item/documents/2018-02/IcLies_DWN_ 
NIJC_Feb2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/KP5T-FFR9].  
 25. Hamed Aleaziz, More than 52,000 People Are Now Being Detained by 
ICE, an Apparent All-Time High, BUZZFEED NEWS (May 20, 2019), https://www 
.buzzfeednews.com/article/hamedaleaziz/ice-detention-record-immigrants 
-border [https://perma.cc/9Z9Q-5RCM].  
 26. Kristen Bialik, ICE Arrests Went Up in 2017, with Biggest Increases in 
Florida, Northern Texas, Oklahoma, PEW RES. CTR. (Feb. 8, 2018), http://www 
.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2018/02/08/ice-arrests-went-up-in-2017-with 
-biggest-increases-in-florida-northern-texas-oklahoma/ [https://perma.cc/W576 
-5SJ4].  
 27. See U.S. IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS ENF’T, FISCAL YEAR 2018 ICE EN-
FORCEMENT AND REMOVAL OPERATIONS 2 (2018), https://www.ice.gov/doclib/ 
about/offices/ero/pdf/eroFY2018Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/22EJ-2UET]. 
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sovereignty.”28 As part of this agenda, Sessions made key deci-
sions to undermine judges’ independence,29 causing one admin-
istrative law scholar to note that “[p]residential administration 
has finally penetrated agency adjudications.”30 Acting Attorney 
General Matthew Whitaker continued where Sessions left off, 
publicly criticizing Central American asylum-seekers as “law-
breakers” with “meritless claims” who “take advantage of loop-
holes that lead to their release into the United States.”31 Attor-
ney General William Barr also has suffered criticism for 
penalizing asylum-seekers with mandatory detention, taking 
away discretion from immigration judges.32 Former Chairman of 
the Board of Immigration Appeals, Paul Wickham Schmidt, has 
denounced a “concerted politically-based attack on migrants and 
the independence of the Immigration Court system orchestrated 
by restrictionist groups outside of government who use unscru-
pulous and willing senior officials like Barr, and Sessions before 
him, as operatives.”33 One is correct to question how much pres-
 
 28. Jeff Sessions, U.S. Attorney Gen., Remarks Announcing the Depart-
ment of Justice’s Renewed Commitment to Criminal Immigration Enforcement 
(Apr. 11, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/attorney-general-jeff-sessions 
-announces-department-justice-s-renewed-commitment-criminal [https:// 
perma.cc/42CV-NUXY]. 
 29. See infra Part II.B. 
 30. Catherine Y. Kim, The President’s Immigration Courts, 68 EMORY L.J. 
1, 34 (2018). Kim discusses both the legal and cultural constraints that have 
kept the president from interfering with the adjudicative activities of executive 
branch agencies, which, she writes, have ended in the Trump administration. 
Id. at 12–16, 37. 
 31. Matthew Whitaker, Acting U.S. Attorney Gen., Remarks on the Im-
portance of a Lawful Immigration System (Dec. 11, 2018), https://www.justice 
.gov/opa/speech/acting-attorney-general-matthew-whitaker-delivers-remarks 
-importance-lawful-immigration [https://perma.cc/N26D-YKPU].  
 32. See, e.g., Letter from Robert M. Carlson, President, Am. Bar Ass’n, to 
William Barr, U.S. Attorney Gen. (Apr. 23, 2019), https://www.americanbar 
.org/content/dam/aba/uncategorized/GAO/ABALettertoAGBarrreMatterofM-S 
-4-23-19.pdf [https://perma.cc/V4JP-8HPS] (critiquing Attorney General opin-
ion in M-S-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 590 (A.G. 2019), which removed immigration judges’ 
discretion in deciding bond for recently-arrived asylum-seekers, and stating, 
“[w]e are also concerned that this decision is one more step in a series of recent 
actions by the Department of Justice to remove discretion and restrict the au-
thority of immigration judges.”). 
 33. Paul Wickham Schmidt, Barr Continues Restrictionist Assault on Im-
migration Courts: Intends To Reverse BIA Precedents Giving “Full Faith & 
Credit” to State Court Sentence Modifications — Another Disingenuous Request 
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sure the “neutral” judges experience to execute the Trump ad-
ministration’s anti-immigrant policies.34 We find ourselves in an 
age where top-level Executive Branch actors have a stated goal 
of detaining as many noncitizens as possible for deportation,35 
and correspondingly pose an increasing threat to immigration 
adjudicators’ independence. This Article explores the intersec-
tion of the two important topics of immigration adjudicators’ in-
dependence and detention.  
The Article proceeds as follows: Part I provides an overview 
of the relevant Fourth Amendment law, which requires a neutral 
judge to review a law enforcement officer’s warrantless arrest in 
order to continue detention and demonstrates why the Fourth 
Amendment applies to immigration arrests, although nominally 
“civil.” Thus, the lack of a truly neutral judge available to review 
DHS arrest decisions exposes the entire immigration detention 
system to a Fourth Amendment challenge. Part I also answers 
doctrinal challenges to importing the Fourth Amendment’s re-
quirement of neutral judge review into the immigration deten-
tion system. In Part II, the Article explains why the current im-
migration system lacks a truly neutral judge. Initially, the 
structural lack of neutrality was a function of the historical 
blending of immigration law’s prosecutorial and adjudicative 
functions. Even once the functions were officially in separate 
agencies as a result of the Homeland Security Act of 2002, the 
adjudicators still worked for the nation’s top law enforcement of-
ficial. At that time, the Attorney General and Department of 
Justice (DOJ) also began what has been called a “war on inde-
pendence” on the adjudicators. Part II offers two examples of 
 
For “Amicus Briefing!,” IMMIGRATIONCOURTSIDE.COM (May 30, 2019), https:// 
immigrationcourtside.com/2019/05/30/barr-continues-restrictionist-assault-on 
-immigration-courts-intends-to-reverse-bia-precedents-giving-full-faith-credit 
-to-state-court-sentence-modifications-another-disi/ [https://perma.cc/HUV9 
-LNQV]. 
 34. Hamed Aleaziz, Being an Immigration Judge Was Their Dream. Under 
Trump, It Became Untenable, BUZZFEED NEWS (Feb. 13, 2019), https://www 
.buzzfeednews.com/article/hamedaleaziz/immigration-policy-judge-resign 
-trump [https://perma.cc/HNJ2-NRZZ]; Bruce J. Einhorn, Jeff Sessions Wants 
To Bribe Judges To Do His Bidding, WASH. POST (Apr. 5, 2018), https://www 
.washingtonpost.com/opinions/jeff-sessions-wants-to-bribe-judges-to-do-his 
-bidding/2018/04/05/fd4bdc48-390a-11e8-acd5-35eac230e514_story.html 
[https://perma.cc/P4BK-V6ME]. 
 35. See, e.g., Border Security Executive Order, supra note 20; Border Secu-
rity Implementation Memo, supra note 20. 
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how immigration judges’ independence has been further under-
mined by statutes and regulations that allow DHS prosecutors 
to override immigration judges’ bond decisions. Part III provides 
a proposal to remedy these systemic violations, which includes 
federal magistrate judge review of any immigration arrest in or-
der to continue detention. 
I.  THE FOURTH AMENDMENT AND IMMIGRATION 
ARRESTS   
This Part discusses the Fourth Amendment’s applicability 
to the immigration enforcement context, thus laying the founda-
tion for why the lack of a truly neutral judge implicates the 
Fourth Amendment rights of all who suffer immigration deten-
tion during removal proceedings. 
A. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT’S REQUIREMENT OF A NEUTRAL 
JUDGE 
The Fourth Amendment provides that “[t]he right of the peo-
ple to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, 
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be vio-
lated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause.”36 
In 1975, in Gerstein v. Pugh,37 the Supreme Court required a 
neutral judge to review a police officer’s decision to arrest a per-
son without probable cause.38 A prosecutor’s decision to bring 
criminal charges was insufficient to determine probable cause 
because the Court did not think that “prosecutorial judgment 
standing alone [met] the requirements of the Fourth Amend-
ment.”39 The Court wrote: 
The point of the Fourth Amendment, which often is not grasped by 
zealous officers, is not that it denies law enforcement the support of the 
usual inferences which reasonable men draw from evidence. Its protec-
tion consists in requiring that those inferences be drawn by a neutral 
and detached magistrate instead of being judged by the officer engaged 
in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime.40 
Thus, to continue detention after initial arrest, the detached 
judgment of a magistrate judge is necessary; the prosecutor’s 
 
 36. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 37. 420 U.S. 103 (1975). 
 38. Id. at 114–19. 
 39. Id. at 117. 
 40. Id. at 112–13 (quoting Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13–14 
(1948)). 
  
1284 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [104:1275 
 
finding of probable cause is insufficient to protect Fourth 
Amendment rights.41 This Fourth Amendment rule applies to 
“any significant pretrial restraint of liberty.”42 
As compared to these strictures of the criminal justice sys-
tem, immigration officers have the authority to arrest nonciti-
zens without a warrant.43 If they obtain a warrant, it is an ad-
ministrative arrest warrant, which was signed by an 
immigration officer—the equivalent of the police.44 
A warrantless arrest requires only that immigration officers 
promptly bring the noncitizen before a different DHS officer to 
be questioned regarding their right to be in the United States.45 
Only later does an immigration judge become involved in the 
process,46 and at no point in the process do the statute or regu-
lations mandate automatic review by a neutral and detached 
magistrate.47  
1. The Applicability of the Fourth Amendment to Immigration 
Arrests 
The Supreme Court has never squarely decided the right to 
have an immigration arrest reviewed for probable cause by a 
neutral judge to continue pretrial detention. There is some com-
mentary on this issue in dicta from the 1960 case United States 
v. Abel.48 In Abel, the Court considered whether an arrest pur-
suant to an administrative warrant issued by immigration au-
thorities, which did not require judicial involvement, should lead 
 
 41. See id. 
 42. Id. at 125 (emphasis added). 
 43. See 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a) (2018); 8 C.F.R. § 287.5 (2019); see also Holper, 
supra note 15, at 963 (describing “regular” removal proceedings). 
 44. See 8 C.F.R. § 236.1(b). 
 45. See id. § 287.3(a); see also id. § 287.3(d) (requiring a decision on whether 
to charge and detain to be made within forty-eight hours unless there are “emer-
gency or other extraordinary circumstance in which case a determination will 
be made within an additional reasonable period of time”). 
 46. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229; see also infra Part II (demonstrating the immigra-
tion judge’s role in authorizing detention). 
 47. Federal circuit courts of appeals may review questions of law or consti-
tutional questions on appeal from the Board of Immigration Appeals of an order 
of removal. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252. Detention challenges may be raised in a habeas 
corpus petition before the federal district court, although the court may not re-
view discretionary decisions regarding custody. See id. § 1226(e); Demore v. 
Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 517 (2003). 
 48. 362 U.S. 217 (1960). 
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to suppression of the evidence under the Fourth Amendment.49 
Declining to suppress the evidence, the Court stated, “[s]tatutes 
authorizing administrative arrest to achieve detention pending 
deportation proceedings have the sanction of time.”50 Yet, the 
Court acknowledged that no litigant had raised that challenge 
to arrest for deportation prior to the Abel case.51 The Court re-
peatedly stated that the petitioner had waived the issue by not 
raising it in prior stages of the litigation, thus rendering its com-
mentary on administrative arrests dicta.52 Also, at that time the 
Court had not yet clarified that the Fourth Amendment applied 
to civil and administrative searches.53 Nor had the Court decided 
subsequent cases applying the Fourth Amendment to border pa-
trol’s enforcement actions.54  
In a 1993 case, Reno v. Flores, children in immigration cus-
tody raised the right to a probable cause hearing, framing the 
issue as a Due Process protection, yet the Court’s holding does 
not extend to adult detention.55 In Reno the Supreme Court re-
 
 49. Id. at 230.  
 50. Id.  
 51. See id. at 233 (“The constitutional validity of this long-standing admin-
istrative arrest procedure in deportation cases has never been directly chal-
lenged in reported litigation. . . . This Court seems never expressly to have di-
rected its attention to the particular question of the constitutional validity of 
administrative deportation warrants. It has frequently, however, upheld ad-
ministrative deportation proceedings shown by the Court’s opinion to have been 
begun by arrests pursuant to such warrants.”). 
 52. See id. at 230 (“The claim that the administrative warrant by which 
petitioner was arrested was invalid, because it did not satisfy the requirements 
for ‘warrants’ under the Fourth Amendment, is not entitled to our consideration 
in the circumstances before us. It was not made below; indeed, it was expressly 
disavowed.”); id. (stating that the petition “did not challenge the exercise of [the 
warrant] authority below, but expressly acknowledged its validity”); id. at 231 
(“At no time did petitioner question the legality of the administrative arrest 
procedure either as unauthorized or unconstitutional. Such challenges were, to 
repeat, disclaimed.”); id. at 232 (“Affirmative acceptance of what is now sought 
to be questioned could not be plainer.”).  
 53. See Kagan, supra note 13, at 134 (discussing Camara v. Municipal 
Court, 386 U.S. 523, 532 (1967), in which the Court held in 1967 that the Fourth 
Amendment applies to civil and administrative searches). 
 54. See, e.g., United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975); Al-
meida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 268 (1973); see also Holper, su-
pra note 15, at 944 (discussing Fourth Amendment’s applicability in border pa-
trol cases). 
 55. Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292 (1993). 
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versed the Ninth Circuit’s mandate that juveniles in Immigra-
tion and Naturalization Services (INS) custody receive Gerstein 
probable cause hearings.56 A Ninth Circuit panel concluded that 
Gerstein did not apply to deportation proceedings and that the 
Gerstein Court itself stressed that its holding was not readily 
transferrable to civil proceedings.57 The panel also followed the 
dicta in Abel, writing that although “[it was] professing not to 
reach the issue of whether an INS arrest warrant was invalid 
because it failed to comply with the fourth amendment’s require-
ments for warrants, the Court nonetheless devoted five pages to 
rejecting petitioner’s claim.”58 An en banc panel of the Ninth Cir-
cuit disagreed, finding that the children’s fundamental liberty 
interest required that “the decision to detain be made only in 
conjunction with a neutral and detached determination of neces-
sity.”59 The Supreme Court held that there was no fundamental 
liberty interest at stake, since the case dealt with INS custody of 
children, who are “always in some form of custody.”60 Thus, 
“shackles, chains, or barred cells” were not at issue, as would be 
the case in adult immigration detention.61 The Court dedicated 
very little of its decision to the procedural due process claim that 
the children should have their detention promptly reviewed for 
probable cause by a neutral judge. Rather, the Court held that 
the juveniles were given ample procedures under the regula-
tions.62 Nowhere in the majority opinion is Gerstein even men-
tioned.63 Because the Flores Court took great pains to ensure 
 
 56. Id.  
 57. Flores ex rel. Galvez-Maldonado v. Meese (Flores I ), 913 F.2d 1315, 
1335–37 (9th Cir. 1990) (citing Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 125 n.27 (1975)). 
The Court remanded to the district court to determine whether such a hearing 
was appropriate under the Mathews v. Eldridge balancing test. See id. at 1337 
(citing Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334–35 (1976)).  
 58. Id. at 1337 (citing Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217, 233 (1960)). 
 59. Flores ex rel. Galvez-Maldonado v. Meese (Flores II ), 942 F.2d 1352, 
1364–65 (9th Cir. 1991) (en banc). 
 60. Id. at 1383 (Wallace, J., dissenting). 
 61. Flores, 507 U.S. at 302.  
 62. Id. at 307–08.  
 63. This is unlike the panel decision and the en banc decisions, which, be-
tween the majority opinions and the concurring and dissenting opinions, yielded 
much discussion about the applicability of Gerstein or whether a prompt proba-
ble cause hearing should be afforded to the juveniles under the Mathews v. El-
dridge test. See Flores II, 942 F.2d at 1364–65 (en banc opinion addressing Ger-
stein issue); Flores I, 913 F.2d at 1335–37 (panel opinion discussion of 
applicability of Gerstein). 
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that it was not deciding about “shackles, chains, or barred cells,” 
the issue of whether adults in immigration detention can seek a 
Gerstein-style hearing was not resolved.64  
Starting in the 1970s, when the Fourth Amendment chal-
lenges involved issues other than the right to have one’s arrest 
reviewed for probable cause, the Court repeatedly applied the 
Fourth Amendment to immigration officers’ enforcement ac-
tions.65 To be sure, the Court’s holdings have suffered critique 
for watering down the strictures of the Fourth Amendment in 
the context of immigration enforcement, for example, that 
they’ve permitted racial profiling and set a low bar for nonciti-
zens to “consent” to searches.66 Yet, this critique does not change 
 
 64. See Kagan, supra note 13, at 151–52. Other courts have not recognized 
a Fourth Amendment right to a neutral detached magistrate to review deten-
tion for probable cause in the immigration context. See, e.g., Salgado v. Scannel, 
561 F.2d 1211, 1212 (5th Cir. 1977) (finding warrantless arrest legal pursuant 
to statute and thus subsequent statement taken following arrest should not be 
suppressed); cf. United States v. Encarnacion, 239 F.3d 395, 399–400 (1st Cir. 
2001) (holding that Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 5(a), which requires a 
prompt probable cause hearing, does not protect detainees arrested for deporta-
tion under 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a)(2)). Some have followed the dicta in Abel. See, e.g., 
Spinella v. Esperdy, 188 F. Supp. 535, 540–41 (S.D.N.Y. 1960) (“While the Su-
preme Court declined to pass upon a similar argument in Abel, . . . some perti-
nent observations there were nonetheless made . . . the court did refer to its 
frequent upholding of administrative deportation proceedings shown to have 
commenced by arrests made pursuant to such warrants.”). Others have as-
sumed, without much analysis, that an immigration officer’s review of the 
charges is the equivalent to prompt review of detention by a magistrate judge. 
See, e.g., Arias v. Rogers, 676 F.2d 1139, 1142 (7th Cir. 1982) (mistakenly rea-
soning that a “special inquiry officer” signed off on the arrest warrant and that 
“[s]pecial inquiry officers have judicial authority . . . and therefore correspond 
to the committing magistrate in a criminal proceeding”); Tejeda-Mata v. Immi-
gration & Naturalization Serv., 626 F.2d 721, 725 (9th Cir. 1980) (“The phrase 
‘has reason to believe’ has been equated with the constitutional requirement of 
probable cause.”); Min-Shey Hung v. United States, 617 F.2d 201, 202 (10th Cir. 
1980); United States v. Cantu, 519 F.2d 494, 496 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 
423 U.S. 1035 (1975); Au Yi Lau v. Immigr. & Naturalization Serv., 445 F.2d 
217, 222 (D.C. Cir. 1971). 
 65. See, e.g., United States. v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 878, 884 
(1975); Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 272–73 (1973). 
 66. See, e.g., Devon W. Carbado & Cheryl I. Harris, Undocumented Crimi-
nal Procedure, 58 UCLA L. REV. 1543, 1549 (2011); Jennifer M. Chacón, Border 
Exceptionalism in the Era of Moving Borders, 38 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 129 (2010); 
Kevin R. Johnson, How Racial Profiling Became the Law of the Land: United 
States v. Brignoni-Ponce and Whren v. United States and the Need for Truly 
Rebellious Lawyering, 98 GEO. L.J. 1005, 1024–25 (2010). 
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the simple fact that the Fourth Amendment does apply.67 The 
applicability of the Fourth Amendment when an ICE officer ar-
rests a noncitizen for deportation is one of the few positive out-
comes of the 1984 decision in INS v. Lopez-Mendoza,68 where the 
Court refused to apply the exclusionary rule, except when immi-
gration officers committed egregious violations of the nonciti-
zen’s Fourth Amendment rights.69 Because the Lopez-Mendoza 
decision dealt only with the remedy of evidentiary exclusion, it 
implicitly recognized that the Fourth Amendment applies to 
such an arrest,70 as subsequent courts have clarified.71 However, 
the Lopez-Mendoza Court’s refusal to apply one of the most rec-
ognized remedies to Fourth Amendment violations to deporta-
tion cases left immigration scholars and advocates losing faith 
in the Fourth Amendment.72 
In 1990, the Court gave immigration law scholars and advo-
cates more reason to lose faith in the Fourth Amendment.73 In 
United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez,74 the Court held that a Mex-
ican citizen could not claim suppression as a remedy for a Fourth 
Amendment violation when U.S. federal agents searched his 
properties in Mexico after he had been arrested in Mexico and 
 
 67. See Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 878 (“The Fourth Amendment applies 
to all seizures of the person, including seizures that involve only a brief deten-
tion short of traditional arrest.”). 
 68. 468 U.S. 1032 (1984). The Court also suggested it might entertain 
Fourth Amendment challenges should the violations become “widespread.” Id. 
at 1050. 
 69. Id. at 1050–51. 
 70. See Kagan, supra note 13, at 147–48; M. Isabel Medina, Ruminations 
on the Fourth Amendment: Case Law, Commentary, and the Word “Citizen,” 11 
HARV. LATINO L. REV. 189, 196 (2008) (“The Lopez-Mendoza opinion accepted 
without question the principle that the Fourth Amendment applied to undocu-
mented persons in a criminal proceeding.”). 
 71. See, e.g., Yanez-Marquez v. Lynch, 789 F.3d 434, 450 (4th Cir. 2015) 
(“To hold otherwise would give no effect to the language used by the Supreme 
Court in Lopez-Mendoza expressing concern over fundamentally unfair methods 
of obtaining evidence and would ignore the fact that eight justices in Lopez-
Mendoza seem to have agreed that the exclusionary rule applies in removal pro-
ceedings in some form.”); Oliva-Ramos v. Attorney Gen. of the U.S., 694 F.3d 
259, 271–72 (3d Cir. 2012); Kandamar v. Gonzales, 464 F.3d 65, 71 (1st Cir. 
2006); Almeida-Amaral v. Gonzales, 461 F.3d 231, 235 (2d Cir. 2006).  
 72. See, e.g., Victor C. Romero, Whatever Happened to the Fourth Amend-
ment?: Undocumented Immigrants’ Rights after INS v. Lopez-Mendoza and 
United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 999 (1992). 
 73. See id. 
 74. 494 U.S. 259 (1990). 
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extradited to the United States for prosecution.75 The Court ex-
amined the history of the Fourth Amendment’s reference to “the 
people” and found that unlike other amendments (such as the 
Fifth Amendment that applies to “persons” and the Sixth 
Amendment that applies to the “accused”), the Fourth Amend-
ment only applies to U.S. citizens or those with voluntary sub-
stantial connections to the political community of the U.S.76 Be-
cause he had not established voluntary “substantial connections” 
to the U.S., Mr. Verdugo-Urquidez could not claim Fourth 
Amendment rights.77 In dicta, the Court wrote that the Fourth 
Amendment should apply to noncitizens who are illegally in the 
U.S.78 This dicta suggests that the thousands of noncitizens who 
are lawfully in the U.S., either as permanent residents or hold-
ers of less permanent immigration statuses, and yet are deport-
able, have a voluntary substantial connection to the political 
community of the U.S. such that they can claim Fourth Amend-
ment protections. Even those who have never been admitted but 
 
 75. Id. at 274–75. 
 76. Id. at 265–67. 
 77. Id. at 271, 274–75.  
 78. Id. at 272–73 (reasoning that “[t]he illegal aliens in Lopez-Mendoza 
were in the United States voluntarily and presumably had accepted some soci-
etal obligations,” which distinguished their cases from that of Mr. Verdugo-Ur-
quidez, who “had no voluntary connections with this country that might place 
him among ‘the people’ of the United States.”). Courts have disagreed about 
whether the plurality opinion’s discussion with respect to whether the Fourth 
Amendment applies to “illegal aliens” is dicta or binding precedent, since Jus-
tice Kennedy, in a concurring opinion, wrote “[i]f the search had occurred in a 
residence within the United States, I have little doubt that the full protections 
of the Fourth Amendment would apply.” Id. at 278 (Kennedy, J., concurring); 
see also Martinez-Aguero v. Gonzalez, No. EP-03-CA-411(KC), 2005 WL 388589, 
at *5 (W.D. Tex. Feb. 2, 2005) (finding that a border crossing-card holder had 
Fourth Amendment rights and stating that “[t]he definition of ‘the people’ ad-
vanced in Verdugo-Urquidez is therefore considered as persuasive authority to 
the extent it applies to resolution of the present motion for summary judg-
ment.”), aff’d and remanded, 459 F.3d 618 (5th Cir. 2006); United States v. Gut-
tierez, 983 F. Supp. 905, 915 (N.D. Cal. 1998) (“It is also noteworthy that a ma-
jority of the justices did not subscribe to Chief Justice Rehnquist’s [Verdugo-
Urquidez] opinion, particularly with respect to his discussion and analysis re-
garding the scope of the Fourth Amendment as it applies to illegal aliens”) rev’d 
on other grounds by United States v. Guttierez, 203 F.3d 833 (9th Cir. 1999). 
But see United States v. Esparza-Mendoza, 265 F. Supp. 2d 1254, 1261 (D. Utah 
2003) (“This court is not at liberty to second-guess Justice Kennedy’s direct 
statement that he was joining the Court’s opinion.”).  
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who have developed community ties to the U.S. should be pro-
tected under this analysis.79 
In 2012, litigation challenging ICE detainers shed new light 
on the applicability of the Fourth Amendment to immigration 
arrests.80 The ICE detainer is a request to state or local author-
ities to “[m]aintain custody” of a person for an additional forty-
eight hours, plus weekends and holidays, “beyond the time when 
the subject would have otherwise been released” from the state 
or local custody.81 When local jails honored ICE’s request and 
refused to release a person until ICE could take custody, those 
held under detainers sued the state authorities, and in some 
cases federal immigration authorities, for damages, arguing that 
 
 79. In Osorio-Martinez v. Attorney General of the United States of America, 
the Third Circuit in 2018 reasoned that petitioners, who had entered the U.S. 
unlawfully, satisfied the eligibility criteria for special immigrant juvenile sta-
tus, but were awaiting availability of visas, developed the “substantial connec-
tions with this country,” such that precluding their challenge to expedited re-
moval via habeas corpus violated the Suspension Clause. 893 F.3d 153 (3d Cir. 
2018) (quoting Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 271). The court reasoned: “This 
is not to suggest that aliens must be accorded a formal statutory designation 
and attendant benefits to lay claim to ‘substantial connections’ to invoke the 
Suspension Clause . . . . We need not address here what minimum requirements 
aliens must meet to lay claim to constitutional protections.” Id. at 170 n.13. Vic-
tor Romero argues, post-Verdugo-Urquidez, that the Fourth Amendment 
“should be about creating a floor of rights, beneath which the United States 
government may not fall.” Victor C. Romero, The Domestic Fourth Amendment 
Rights of Undocumented Immigrants: On Gutierrez and the Tort Law/Immi-
gration Law Parallel, 35 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 57, 62 (2000). He advocates 
for the application of tort reform, in which a property owner owes the same duty 
of care regardless of whether the person injured is an invitee, a licensee, or a 
trespasser; in the same way, the U.S. government owes a duty to not unreason-
ably seize a lawful permanent resident, visa holder, or undocumented nonciti-
zen. Id. at 79–82. Carolina Nuñez, discussing courts’ broad application of Ver-
dugo-Urquidez, argues that courts should be evaluating membership and the 
ensuing Fourth Amendment rights guaranteed to members of the U.S. commu-
nity by looking not at proxies such as status, but at a more complex theory of 
membership, such as community ties and mutuality of obligation. See D. Caro-
lina Núñez, Inside the Border, Outside the Law: Undocumented Immigrants and 
the Fourth Amendment, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 85, 137 (2011).  
 80. See, e.g., Kagan, supra note 13; see also Holper, supra note 15. 
 81. U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., I-247 IMMIGRATION DETAINER FORM 
(2019), https://www.ice.gov/doclib/secure-communities/pdf/immigration 
-detainer-form.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y8XP-F8LY]; see also 8 C.F.R. § 287.7(d) 
(2019) (describing the length of time that ICE can detain a person who is not 
otherwise detained by a criminal justice agency). 
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this continued custody was a new “seizure” for Fourth Amend-
ment purposes, and lacked probable cause.82 Because nonciti-
zens enjoy the same rights as citizens when charged or held for 
a crime,83 several courts responded to the unlawful seizure of a 
noncitizen pursuant to an ICE detainer by analyzing their cases 
under traditional Fourth Amendment principles.84 
In fact, the First Circuit Court of Appeals found that the ap-
plicability of the Fourth Amendment to arrests pursuant to ICE 
detainers was so obvious that “existing precedent . . . placed the 
statutory or constitutional question beyond debate.”85 
 
 82. See, e.g., Roy v. Cty. of L.A., No. CV 12-09012-AB (FFMx), 2018 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 27268, at *68–70 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 7, 2018) (finding that Los Angeles 
Sheriff’s Department’s practice of holding inmates beyond their release dates 
on the basis of immigration detainers “constitutes a new arrest under the 
Fourth Amendment” and therefore violated detainees’ Fourth Amendment 
rights because there was no judicial finding of probable cause); Parada v. Anoka 
Cty., 332 F. Supp. 3d 1229, 1243 (D. Minn. 2018) (finding local county honoring 
ICE detainer violated detainee’s Fourth Amendment rights); Orellana v. Nobles 
Cty., 230 F. Supp. 3d 934, 945 (D. Minn. 2017) (immigration detainee’s contin-
ued confinement after he would have been released on state charges of driving 
under the influence, pursuant to ICE detainer, violated his rights under the 
Fourth Amendment); Moreno v. Napolitano, 213 F. Supp. 3d 999, 1001, 1004–
09 (N.D. Ill. 2016) (granting summary judgment to class of individuals targeted 
by ICE detainers on their claim that ICE’s practice of issuing detainers without 
obtaining an arrest warrant was prohibited by the INA and finding that the 
warrantless arrest power of § 1357(a)(2) did not defeat their claim because “im-
migration officers make no determination whatsoever that the subject of a de-
tainer is likely to escape upon release before a warrant can be obtained”); Mi-
randa-Olivares v. Clackamas Cty., No. 3:12-cv-02317-ST, 2014 WL 1414305, at 
*10 (D. Or. Apr. 11, 2014); see also ICE Detainers and the Fourth Amendment: 
What Do Recent Federal Court Decisions Mean?, AM. CIV. LIBERTIES UNION 
(Nov. 13, 2014), https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/assets/2014_11_13_-_ 
ice_detainers_4th_am_limits.pdf [https://perma.cc/52NB-QQWS] [hereinafter 
ICE Detainers] (collecting cases where holding a noncitizen under ICE detainer 
was found to be a new arrest for Fourth Amendment purposes); Recent ICE De-
tainer Damages Cases, AM. CIV. LIBERTIES UNION (Apr. 3, 2018), https://www 
.aclu.org/fact-sheet/recent-ice-detainer-damages-cases-2018) [https://perma.cc/ 
32WJ-QCMQ] [hereinafter Recent ICE Detainer Damages]. 
 83. See Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 216 (1979) (“[D]etention for 
custodial interrogation—regardless of its label—intrudes so severely on inter-
ests protected by the Fourth Amendment as necessarily to trigger the tradi-
tional safeguards against illegal arrest.”). 
 84. See Recent ICE Detainer Damages, supra note 82; ICE Detainers, supra 
note 82, at 3–4. 
 85. Morales v. Chadbourne, 793 F.3d 208, 214 (1st Cir. 2015) (quoting Ash-
croft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741 (2011)). The court made this finding in re-
sponse to ICE officials claiming qualified immunity, which would allow them to 
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In addition to the detainer litigation, in 2012 the Supreme 
Court in Arizona v. United States86 reiterated, albeit in dicta, 
that the Fourth Amendment applies to arrests for immigration 
enforcement purposes.87 The detainer cases and this most recent 
language on the applicability of the Fourth Amendment to im-
migration arrests thus have left the door open to the application 
of a different Fourth Amendment right; namely, the right to re-
view of detention by a neutral judge for probable cause, and re-
lease should that review not occur.88 It is thus time to reevaluate 
the waived arguments from the 1960 Abel case or see how they 
apply to the detention of adults, not children (as in the 1993 Flo-
res case). Scholars and advocates could again find faith in the 
Fourth Amendment.  
Following the successful detainer litigation, Michael Kagan 
has argued that “immigration law’s looming Fourth Amendment 
problem” is the lack of a prompt probable cause hearing.89 Kagan 
 
avoid liability for damages if they did not know that the Fourth Amendment 
applied in this context. Id.; see also Parada, 332 F. Supp. 3d 1229, 1239 (same); 
Galarza v. Szalczyk, 2012 WL 1080020, at *14 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 30, 2012) (denying 
the ICE officer qualified immunity), rev’d on other grounds, 745 F.3d 634 (3d 
Cir. 2014). 
 86. 567 U.S. 387 (2012). 
 87. The Court considered section 2(B) of the law, which required Arizona 
officers to make a “reasonable attempt . . . to determine the immigration status” 
of any person they stop, detain, or arrest on some other legitimate basis if “rea-
sonable suspicion exists that the person is an alien and is unlawfully present in 
the United States.” Id. at 411 (quoting ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 11-1051(B) 
(West 2012)). The law also provided that “[a]ny person who is arrested shall 
have the person’s immigration status determined before the person is released.” 
Id. (quoting ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 11-1051(B) (West 2012)). While the Court 
found that other provisions of Arizona’s law were preempted by federal law, 
section 2(B) was not, because nothing in federal law prohibited states from shar-
ing information with ICE. Id. at 411–12. When challengers suggested that Ari-
zona officials would delay the release of individuals pending information from 
ICE, the Court stated, citing Fourth Amendment cases, that such holds would 
be illegal. Id. at 413 (citing Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323, 333 (2009); Illinois 
v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 407 (2005)). The Court also stated: “[it] is not a crime 
for a removable alien to remain present in the United States . . . if the police 
stop someone based on nothing more than possible removability, the usual pred-
icate for an arrest is absent.” Id. at 407.  
 88. See Kagan, supra note 13, at 158–61; see also Holper, supra note 15, at 
955–62 (proposing a probable cause hearing in front of an immigration judge); 
Holper, supra note 14, at 267–87 (proposing a similar solution). 
 89. See generally Kagan, supra note 13 (explaining why immigration deten-
tions are looking more and more like criminal detentions, and thus need proba-
ble cause). 
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examines immigration law’s lack of such a hearing, which pre-
sents an overlap between Fourth and Fifth Amendment Due 
Process rights, since guaranteeing such a hearing “is, in effect, a 
requirement for a certain kind of process.”90 He proposes that 
courts interpret the statute and regulations to provide a prompt 
probable cause hearing before an immigration judge, in order to 
avoid finding them unconstitutional.91 Drawing on the Supreme 
Court cases examining immigration detention under a Due Pro-
cess analysis, Kagan argues that, while most of those cases ex-
amined immigration detention at the “back end,” his proposal 
would require courts to examine such detention at the “front 
end.”92 In this Article, I diverge from Kagan in that I do not pre-
sume the neutrality of the immigration judge to satisfy the Ger-
stein requirement of neutrality.93  
I believe that such a challenge to immigration detention can 
be made by examining the problem exclusively through the lens 
of the Fourth Amendment, instead of through the Due Process 
Clause. Due process is flexible,94 and can vary depending on is-
sues such as the detainee’s status, length of time in the U.S., and 
the length of detention.95 The Fourth Amendment has its own 
 
 90. Id. at 129. 
 91. Id. at 129–30 (writing that “in Zadvydas, the Court opened the door to 
‘constitutional limitations,’ not only due process claims” (quoting Zadvydas v. 
Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 695 (2001))). Kagan wrote his article before the Supreme 
Court’s 2018 Jennings decision, in which the Court struck down the Ninth Cir-
cuit’s use of the constitutional avoidance doctrine to mandate periodic bond 
hearings with the burden of proof on the government. Jennings v. Rodriguez, 
138 S. Ct. 830, 842 (2018). Holding that the Ninth Circuit’s reading was not a 
plausible reading of the statutes authorizing detention, the Court remanded the 
case back to the Ninth Circuit to decide whether prolonged detention under the 
statutes violated the detainees’ due process rights. Id. at 851. 
 92. Kagan, supra note 13, at 128. 
 93. See infra Part II; see also Kagan, supra note 13, at 169 (recognizing that 
“the reliance on immigration judges would not create a mechanism for a ‘judicial 
determination of probable cause,’” yet reasoning that “immigration judges could 
provide a significant measure of detachment from the ICE officers who arrest 
people for immigration violations” (quoting Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 114 
(1975))). 
 94. See Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972) (“[D]ue process is 
flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the particular situation de-
mands.”). 
 95. Compare Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 36 (1982) (due process re-
quires hearing for lawful permanent resident stopped at the border who seeks 
to come back to the U.S.), with United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 
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limitations that require a certain level of balancing as well,96 but 
a Fourth Amendment inquiry focuses on the reasonableness of 
the seizure, not the status of the person harmed by the seizure 
or whether the proceedings that follow are punishment.97 It also 
does not factor in the financial cost of the added procedures, as 
the Due Process balancing test of Mathews v. Eldridge does.98 In 
this way, the Fourth Amendment provides one lens through 
which to view an immigration system where individuals who are 
detained for a variety of reasons, with a variety of statuses, and 
with differing ties to the U.S. all suffer the same constitutional 
harm—detention without review by a neutral judge.99 It can be 
a forgotten Amendment when the question is preventive (as op-
posed to punitive) detention, as immigration detention is.100  
It is also true that providing a Gerstein hearing before a 
truly neutral judge is no panacea of rights for an immigration 
detainee. Scholars have critiqued Gerstein’s lack of procedures 
to protect against an erroneous finding of probable cause,101 
 
U.S. 537, 544 (1950) (considering the due process claim of applicant for admis-
sion to the U.S. and stating, “[w]hatever the procedure authorized by Congress 
is, it is due process as far as an alien denied entry is concerned”). 
 96. See United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 555 (1976) (“In de-
lineating the constitutional safeguards applicable in particular contexts, the 
Court has weighed the public interest against the Fourth Amendment interests 
of the individual, a process evident in our previous cases dealing with Border 
Patrol traffic-checking operations.” (citations omitted)).  
 97. See Holper, supra note 15, at 930–32. Of course, the remedies available 
for Fourth Amendment violations depend on the nature of the proceedings. See 
id. at 955–69 (discussing various remedies for Fourth Amendment violations 
occurring in expedited and administrative removal). 
 98. Id. at 960 (citing Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976)). 
 99. See Peter H. Schuck, INS Detention and Removal: A “White Paper,” 11 
GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 667, 706 (1997) (describing diverse population of “detainable 
aliens” and recommending that INS, as a federal agency, use uniform proce-
dures). 
 100. Beyond the scope of this Article is an examination of how courts came 
to examine preventive detention schemes primarily through the lens of the Due 
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment instead of the Fourth Amendment’s 
prohibition on unreasonable seizures. David Cole has briefly discussed the ap-
plication of the Fourth Amendment to preventive detention such as immigration 
detention. See David Cole, Out of the Shadows: Preventive Detention, Suspected 
Terrorists, and War, 97 CAL. L. REV. 693, 712 (2009) (“[W]hile preventive deten-
tion has most often been analyzed through the lens of due process, the Fourth 
Amendment also imposes limits on the practice.”). 
 101. See, e.g., Niki Kuckes, Civil Due Process, Criminal Due Process, 25 YALE 
L. & POL’Y REV. 1, 27–28 (2006); George C. Thomas III, The Poisoned Fruit of 
Pretrial Detention, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 413, 421–23 (1986). 
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since the Gerstein hearing is satisfied without the presence of 
the detainee and the “full panoply of adversarial safeguards—
counsel, confrontation, cross-examination, and compulsory pro-
cess for witnesses.”102 The probable cause hearing may provide 
only a “speed bump” in the criminal justice process, yet it re-
quires prosecutors to ensure that there is sufficient evidence to 
proceed.103 Also, providing a truly neutral decision-maker to jus-
tify a detainee’s continued pretrial detention, which often can 
last years, provides the requisite neutral check on the thousands 
of DHS detention decisions that are made each year. As scholars 
document a growing number of wrongful deportations,104 includ-
ing deportations of U.S. citizens,105 this probable cause “speed 
bump” provides a critical procedural protection against wrongful 
detentions.  
a. Potential Limits on Applying a Gerstein Hearing to 
Immigration Detention 
There will certainly be critics that argue against a wholesale 
importation of the Gerstein neutral judge review mandate into 
the immigration context. Here, I address these doctrinal con-
cerns.106  
First, the plenary power of the political branches over immi-
gration law would cause a court to balk at second-guessing Con-
gress’s choice of procedures when it comes to enforcing immigra-
tion law. The Supreme Court has found detention to be a valid 
 
 102. Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 119 (1975). 
 103. Telephone Interview with Timothy Watkins, former federal defender, 
now Dir.’s Leadership Program Resident, Admin. Office of the U.S. Courts 
(Sept. 7, 2018). 
 104. See Amanda Frost, Learning from Our Mistakes: Using Immigration 
Enforcement Errors to Guide Reform, 92 DENV. U. L. REV. 769, 777–79 (2015) 
(explaining how detention of U.S. citizens, terminations of removal, and sum-
mary removal errors are common); Fatma Marouf et al., Justice on the Fly: The 
Dangers of Errant Deportations, 75 OHIO ST. L.J. 337, 384–87 (2014) (outlining 
the ratio between stays of removal and successful cases); Rachel E. Rosenbloom, 
Remedies for the Wrongly Deported: Territoriality, Finality, and the Significance 
of Departure, 33 U. HAW. L. REV. 139, 146–53 (2010) (explaining that a surge in 
enforcement has likely made wrongful deportations more frequent). 
 105. Jacqueline Stevens, U.S. Government Unlawfully Detaining and De-
porting U.S. Citizens as Aliens, 18 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 606, 608 (2011). 
 106. I recognize that there also will be practical, logistical concerns; these 
are discussed in Part III. 
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part of the deportation process,107 so, the argument goes, with 
the plenary power to deport or exclude comes the plenary power 
to detain during that process. In the foundational case for this 
assertion, Wong Wing v. United States,108 the Court assumed 
that the procedures would involve “temporary confinement” to 
last just “while arrangements were being made for their depor-
tation.”109 In fact, “the government could have deported Wong 
Wing from Detroit to Canada in thirty minutes.”110 Notably, de-
tention for thirty minutes would not violate the Fourth Amend-
ment rights of a person held for criminal trial today.111  
In Wong Wing, the Chinese national was not being held for 
deportation when he filed his case, but was confined to hard la-
bor in the Detroit House of Correction;112 the Court held that this 
confinement at hard labor was punishment, which could not be 
imposed without a criminal trial.113 The Court justified deten-
tion as part of the deportation process by likening it to detention 
as part of the criminal process: 
  We think it clear that detention, or temporary confinement, as part 
of the means necessary to give effect to the provisions for the exclusion 
or expulsion of aliens would be valid. Proceedings to exclude or expel 
would be vain if those accused could not be held in custody pending the 
inquiry into their true character and while arrangements were being 
made for their deportation. Detention is a usual feature of every case 
 
 107. See, e.g., Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 524 (2003) (“[T]his Court has 
recognized detention during deportation proceedings as a constitutionally valid 
aspect of the deportation process. As we said more than a century ago, deporta-
tion proceedings ‘would be vain if those accused could not be held in custody 
pending the inquiry into their true character.’” (quoting Wong Wing v. United 
States, 163 U.S. 228, 235 (1896))); Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524, 538 (1952) 
(“Detention is necessarily part of this deportation procedure. Otherwise aliens 
arrested for deportation would have opportunities to hurt the United States 
during the pendency of deportation proceedings.”). 
 108. Wong Wing, 163 U.S. 228. 
 109. Id. at 235. 
 110. Gerald L. Neuman, Wong Wing v. United States: The Bill of Rights Pro-
tects Illegal Aliens, in IMMIGRATION STORIES 31, 36 (2005).  
 111. See County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 55–56 (1991) (in-
terpreting prompt probable cause hearing mandated under the Fourth Amend-
ment to occur within forty-eight hours). 
 112. Neuman, supra note 110, at 35–36. While his case was on appeal to the 
Supreme Court, the circuit court had admitted Wong Wing to bail pending ap-
peal. Id. at 35. 
 113. Wong Wing, 163 U.S. at 237. 
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of arrest on a criminal charge, even when an innocent person is wrong-
fully accused; but it is not imprisonment in a legal sense.114 
If an arrest on a criminal charge necessarily involves deten-
tion,115 and subsequent case law mandated such detention to be 
reviewed by a neutral judge for probable cause,116 then shouldn’t 
Wong Wing stand for this same proposition in the immigration 
arrest context? Notably, in subsequent Supreme Court decisions 
citing to Wong Wing for the assertion that detention is neces-
sarily part of the deportation process, no litigants raised a 
Fourth Amendment challenge.117 And, the Wong Wing Court 
confirmed that the Constitution applies to those who are undoc-
umented, notwithstanding the Court’s prior affirmations of Con-
gress’s plenary power over immigration law.118 The Court’s later 
 
 114. Id. at 235. 
 115. See id. 
 116. See Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 114 (1975) (“When the stakes are 
this high, the detached judgment of a neutral magistrate is essential.”). 
 117. See Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 523 (2003) (finding no Fifth Amend-
ment due process claim for mandatory detention pending removal proceedings); 
Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524, 555–56 (1952) (finding no merit to Fifth and 
Eighth Amendment challenges). In the 2003 Demore v. Kim case, nobody chal-
lenged the neutrality of the judge; indeed, Mr. Kim would have welcomed any 
hearing before an immigration judge, since he had no hearing to review his de-
tention. Demore, 538 U.S. at 514; see also Kagan, supra note 13, at 154 
(“Demore . . . stand[s] for the rule that Congress may designate a particular 
class of people for mandatory detention while their cases are pending based on 
a presumption of flight risk or dangerousness. But this does not address the 
procedural safeguards required to determine whether a person actually belongs 
in this disfavored class.”). When the Court decided Carlson in 1952, the right to 
a probable cause hearing by a neutral judge after a warrantless arrest had yet 
to be established in the criminal justice context, much less applied to pretrial 
detention during the deportation process. See Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 114 (estab-
lishing Fourth Amendment right to neutral judge review of probable cause to 
continue detention after arrest in 1975). Also, at that time the Court had not 
yet clarified that the Fourth Amendment applies to administrative arrests. See 
Kagan, supra note 13, at 134 (discussing Camara v. Municipal Court, in which 
the Court held in 1967 that the Fourth Amendment applies to civil and admin-
istrative searches). 
 118. See Neuman, supra note 110, at 41 (describing Wong Wing as “a series 
of firsts . . . the first Supreme Court decision invalidating a federal immigration 
statute, the first Supreme Court holding that the Bill of Rights protects aliens 
against the federal government, and the first Supreme Court confirmation of 
the constitutional rights of illegal aliens”); see also David Cole, In Aid of Re-
moval: Due Process Limits on Immigration Detention, 51 EMORY L. J. 1003, 1016 
(2002) (“[A]t the very height of deference to plenary immigration power, the 
Court in Wong Wing applied to immigration detention the same principle that 
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decisions also confirmed that the plenary power does not dimin-
ish all Fourth Amendment rights.119 Moreover, immigration de-
tention pending removal proceedings today frequently lasts well 
beyond the thirty minutes it took for Wong Wing to be deported: 
for a class of detainees challenging their prolonged detention, 
detention lengths averaged between 346 to 427 days, with some 
lasting up to 1,585 days.120 
The plenary power relates to the political branches’ power 
to exclude121 and deport;122 it should not extend to the power to 
detain. As David Cole has noted, the defenders of unchecked de-
tention as part of the deportation process “have confused the 
power to deport with the power to detain,”123 and thus have un-
necessarily extended the political branches’ plenary power over 
decisions to expel and deport to detention decisions during those 
processes.124 Also, as stated by the Supreme Court in the 2001 
 
it has subsequently applied in other civil detention cases: an absolute prohibi-
tion on the use of civil detention for punitive ends.” (citing Wong Wing, 163 U.S. 
at 235)). 
 119. United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 884 (1975); Almeida-
Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 272–73 (1973). But cf. United States v. 
Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 537 (1985) (describing federal govern-
ment’s authority to conduct routine, suspicionless searches at the border as “ple-
nary” (citing United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 616–17 (1977))). 
 120. See Rodriguez v. Robbins, 804 F.3d 1060, 1079–80 (9th Cir. 2015), rev’d, 
Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. 830 (2018). The Rodriguez class was subdi-
vided into three subclasses. For those subject to mandatory detention pursuant 
to 8 U.S.C.§ 1226(c), the average length of detention was 427 days, with the 
longest-detained class member confined for 1,585 days (and counting). Id. The 
8 U.S.C. § 1225(b) subclass members had been detained for as long as 831 days, 
and for an average of 346 days each. Id. at 1081. At the time petitioners gener-
ated their report, one 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) subclass member had been detained for 
1,234 days with no definite end in sight. Id. at 1085. 
 121. See Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2419 (2018) (“For more than a 
century, this Court has recognized that the admission and exclusion of foreign 
nationals is a ‘fundamental sovereign attribute exercised by the Government’s 
political departments largely immune from judicial control.’” (quoting Fiallo v. 
Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 792 (1977))). 
 122. Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 713 (1893) (applying ple-
nary power to deportation decisions). 
 123. Cole, supra note 118, at 1038. 
 124. Id. at 1016; see also Peter H. Schuck, The Transformation of Immigra-
tion Law, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 28 (1984) (“[T]he detention authority is more 
than a programmatic resource, ancillary to the power to exclude and deport. 
Detention is also an awesome power in its own right.”).  
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case of Zadvydas v. Davis,125 “[the plenary power] is subject to 
important constitutional limitations.”126 
Second, the Court in Gerstein limited its holding to the crim-
inal justice system; it was never intended to apply outside of that 
context.127 But in another civil detention system in which juve-
niles are arrested for delinquency, the Court in Schall v. Mar-
tin128 used Gerstein as a benchmark in a procedural Due Process 
analysis.129 The Court determined that the procedures afforded 
to juveniles by the state, which included a probable cause hear-
ing before a Family Court judge within three days, would be con-
stitutionally adequate under Gerstein.130 As noted by the Ninth 
Circuit, however, the juvenile procedures in place under the 
state law were more protective than Gerstein hearings as they 
existed at the time, and thus the Court never reached whether 
 
 125. 533 U.S. 678 (2001). 
 126. Id. at 695. For example, federal courts have not found the Court’s 1953 
decision in Shaughnessy v. U.S. ex rel. Mezei to stand for the sweeping proposi-
tion that persons seeking admission have no constitutional rights when making 
claims related to their detention. 345 U.S. 206, 216 (1953); see also Rosales-
Garcia v. Holland, 322 F.3d 386, 414 (6th Cir. 2003) (reasoning that to the ex-
tent that Mezei stands for the proposition that arriving aliens have no constitu-
tional rights, cases in which “the contours of constitutionally permissible civil 
detention are rigorously delineated” is a “substantial jurisprudential develop-
ment from the time that Mezei was decided” (citing Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 
U.S. 346 (1997); Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71 (1997); United States v. Sa-
lerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987); Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1987))); Chi Thon 
Ngo v. INS, 192 F.3d 390, 396 (3d Cir. 1999) (“The case before us does not ques-
tion the validity of the procedures used to admit or exclude petitioner, but it is 
against that backdrop that we consider whether the indeterminable nature of 
his detention pending ultimate deportation rises to a constitutional violation. 
Even an excludable alien is a ‘person’ for purposes of the Fifth Amendment and 
is thus entitled to substantive due process.”). 
 127. See Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 125 n.27 (1975) (“The Fourth 
Amendment was tailored explicitly for the criminal justice system, and its bal-
ance between individual and public interests always has been thought to define 
the ‘process that is due’ for seizures of person or property in criminal cases, 
including the detention of suspects pending trial.”); Flores I, 913 F.2d 1335, 
1336 (9th Cir. 1990); see also Project Release v. Provost, 722 F.2d 960, 975 (2d 
Cir. 1983) (declining to extend Gerstein to civil commitment statutes and finding 
no due process violation when the state statute provides for a judicial hearing 
within five days of demand by patient, relative, or friend, as well as habeas cor-
pus relief). 
 128. 467 U.S. 253 (1984). 
 129. Id. at 274–75. 
 130. Id. at 274–77.  
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less process would be constitutionally adequate.131 Also, the Su-
preme Court has described juvenile delinquency proceedings as 
“functionally akin to a criminal trial,”132 and thus deserving of 
near-identical procedures to those used in the criminal justice 
process.133 Yet many have made that same argument about de-
portation proceedings—that although civil, “deportation is dif-
ferent,”134 and thus deserving of heightened procedural protec-
tions akin to those seen in the juvenile delinquency system.135  
This is especially so after the Supreme Court’s 2010 decision 
in Padilla v. Kentucky,136 where the Court recognized a Sixth 
Amendment right to advice regarding immigration conse-
quences,137 a watershed decision that caused many to question 
whether the Court now sees deportation as deserving of more 
procedures than are available in other civil contexts.138 Peter 
 
 131. Flores I, 913 F.2d at 1336. 
 132. Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 789 n.12 (1967). 
 133. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 368 (1970) (holding that due process 
requires that the burden of proof in juvenile delinquency proceedings be beyond 
reasonable doubt); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 31–56 (1967) (explaining that due 
process requires right to appropriate notice, counsel, confrontation and cross-
examination, and privilege against self-incrimination in juvenile delinquency 
proceedings); Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 557 (1966) (explaining that 
due process requires the right to a hearing, that counsel be given access to rec-
ords, and a statement of reasons before a case is transferred from juvenile court 
to adult court). But see McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971) (holding 
that the right to trial by jury in juvenile delinquency proceedings is not required 
under the due process clause). 
 134. Peter L. Markowitz, Deportation Is Different, 13 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 
1299 (2011). 
 135. See, e.g., Daniel Kanstroom, Deportation, Social Control, and Punish-
ment: Some Thoughts About Why Hard Laws Make Bad Cases, 113 HARV. L. 
REV. 1890, 1931–32 (2000) (arguing that juvenile delinquency proceedings can 
provide an example of proceedings that are civil in name but many of the pro-
tections of a criminal trial attach); Anita Ortiz Maddali, Padilla v. Kentucky: A 
New Chapter in Supreme Court Jurisprudence on Whether Deportation Consti-
tutes Punishment for Lawful Permanent Residents?, 61 AM. U. L. REV. 1, 49–57 
(2011) (discussing how juvenile delinquency proceedings can provide a helpful 
analogy to how procedural protections should apply in deportation proceedings); 
Robert Pauw, A New Look at Deportation as Punishment: Why at Least Some of 
the Constitution’s Criminal Procedure Protections Must Apply, 52 ADMIN. L. 
REV. 305, 316–17 (2000) (discussing juvenile delinquency proceedings as a 
“quasi-criminal” proceeding where some of the constitutional protections of a 
criminal trial are available even though the proceeding is nominally civil). 
 136. 559 U.S. 356 (2010). 
 137. Id. at 374. 
 138. See, e.g., Daniel Kanstroom, Padilla v. Kentucky and the Evolving Right 
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Markowitz has described the Padilla decision as one more exam-
ple of where the Court has allowed “a uniquely criminal law doc-
trine [to] creep[]…into the ‘civil’ deportation realm.”139 He ex-
plains that the Court’s watered-down application of the Fourth 
Amendment exclusionary rule in Lopez-Mendoza is another ex-
ample of the Court allowing “the criminal square peg [to] fit in 
the civil round holes,”140 notwithstanding the Court’s early label-
ing of deportation as “civil.”141 Thus, there is every reason to ap-
ply Gerstein out of its original criminal context when the issue is 
pre-trial detention for deportation. 
In other civil detention contexts, the statutes authorizing 
such detention frequently had a judge overseeing the detention 
decision, so when challenged under the Due Process Clause, the 
neutrality of the decision-maker is rarely discussed.142 In the 
context of deciding the procedures necessary for parole revoca-
tion, in Morrissey v. Brewer143 the Court held that due process 
required an independent decision-maker, but that need not be a 
 
to Deportation Counsel: Watershed or Work-in-Progress?, 45 NEW ENG. L. REV. 
305, 319 (2011); Daniel Kanstroom, The Right to Deportation Counsel in Padilla 
v. Kentucky: The Challenging Construction of the Fifth-and-a-Half Amendment, 
58 UCLA L. REV. 1461 (2011); Maddali, supra note 135; Markowitz, supra note 
134. 
 139. Markowitz, supra note 134, at 1324.  
 140. Id. at 1318. 
 141. Id. at 1311–12 (citing Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698 
(1893)). 
 142. See, e.g., United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 750 (1987) (pretrial 
detention based on dangerousness is decided in full adversarial hearing pre-
sided over by a neutral judge); Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979) (civil 
detention for mental illness and danger to self or others authorized by a judge). 
In Parham v. J.R., the Court found that a treating psychiatrist was neutral 
enough to commit a minor to a mental hospital. 442 U.S. 584 (1979). However, 
the Court did not believe that such decisions required a full adversarial hearing; 
nor did the Court describe the institution’s psychiatrists who made the decisions 
as acting in any sort of a zealous manner pursuant to some law enforcement 
purpose, the way that ICE officers act. Compare id. at 615–16 (quoting district 
court’s findings that it was “impressed by the conscientious, dedicated state em-
ployed psychiatrists who, with the help of equally conscientious, dedicated state 
employed psychologists and social workers, faithfully care for the plaintiff chil-
dren” (quoting J.L. v. Parham, 412 F. Supp. 112, 138 (M.D. Ga. 1976))), with 
Enforcement and Removal Operations, ICE (Aug. 15, 2019), https://www.ice 
.gov/about [https://perma.cc/5ZBU-EW7R] (describing ICE Enforcement and 
Removal operations as “identif[ying] and apprehend[ing] removable aliens, de-
tain[ing] these individuals when necessary and remov[ing] illegal aliens from 
the United States”). 
 143. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972). 
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judicial officer, so long as it was an “independent deci-
sionmaker.”144 Morrissey was a due process case, not a Fourth 
Amendment case, so the Court was not examining the proce-
dures through the Gerstein lens (nor had Gerstein yet been de-
cided).145 It is also instructive to examine the subsequent devel-
opments around parole revocation in the federal system; four 
years after Morrissey was decided, Congress created the U.S. Pa-
role Commission as an independent agency within the DOJ.146 
One of the reasons to create such an independent agency was to 
separate parole decision-making from the prosecutors in the 
DOJ.147 
Third, the thousands of immigration arrests happening each 
year, although not reviewed by a neutral judge, are “reasonable” 
seizures within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment148 be-
cause their purpose is not primarily to investigate crime, but to 
enforce a civil regulatory scheme.149 In the 1967 case Camara v. 
 
 144. Id. at 486. 
 145. Justice Douglas, in his dissent, highlighted that this supposedly “inde-
pendent” decision-maker is not truly independent. See id. at 497–98 (Douglas, 
J., dissenting) (“The hearing should not be before the parole officer, as he is the 
one who is making the charge and ‘there is inherent danger in combining the 
functions of judge and advocate.’”).  
 146. See 18 U.S.C. § 4203(b) (2012). The House Conference Report creating 
the Parole Commission stated that the law was necessary in order to create a 
less disparate and more predictable process that both prisoners and the public 
would more readably understand and accept. See H.R. REP. NO. 94-838, at 20 
(1976) (Conf. Rep.).  
 147. See H.R. REP. NO. 94-838, at 20; see also S. REP. NO. 94-369, at 20 (1975) 
(noting that even though the Commission would be part of the Department of 
Justice, having a decision-making process that was independent from the De-
partment would guard against influence in cases). 
 148. See Robert M. Bloom, Border Searches in the Age of Terrorism, 78 MISS. 
L. J. 295, 299 (2008) (describing reasonableness as “touchstone” for Fourth 
Amendment rights); Chacón, supra note 66, at 134 (“[T]he test for Fourth 
Amendment ‘reasonableness’ turns on the balance between the government’s 
interest and the individual’s right to privacy.”). 
 149. Cf. City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 44 (2000) (declining to 
suspend usual requirement of individualized suspicion where the police set up 
a non-border checkpoint “primarily for the ordinary enterprise of investigating 
crimes”); see also Carbado & Harris, supra note 66, at 1608–13 (explaining that 
one reason why Fourth Amendment Supreme Court cases involving racial pro-
filing of Latinos do not “occupy significant space in the literature on racial pro-
filing” is because these cases are not centrally about the enforcement of criminal 
law and thus are seen by criminal law scholars as part of the Court’s “‘special 
needs’/regulatory/administrative search and seizure jurisprudence”). 
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Municipal Court,150 the Supreme Court permitted health inspec-
tors to search houses without individualized suspicion of a viola-
tion.151 The Court, however, still required an “area warrant” is-
sued by a judge so as to limit the discretion of each inspector.152 
In the immigration detention context, the intrusion is signifi-
cantly more—the taking away of physical liberty, not the search 
of one’s house.153 Nor does it seem plausible that the thousands 
of noncitizens subject to immigration detention should have a 
reduced expectation of privacy that would justify being put in a 
jail, as would the owner of a “closely regulated” industry whose 
business property may be subject to warrantless inspection.154  
Fourth, “[s]pecial needs”155 such as border control justify im-
migration arrests and detention without the approval of a neu-
tral judge.156 This would likely be the most-favored response of 
 
 150. 387 U.S. 523 (1967). 
 151. Id. at 536–37. 
 152. Id. 
 153. See United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 555–56 
(1985) (Souter, J., dissenting) (“Something has gone fundamentally awry in our 
constitutional jurisprudence when a neutral and detached magistrate’s author-
ization is required before the authorities may inspect ‘the plumbing, heating, 
ventilation, gas, and electrical systems’ in a person’s home, . . . or poke through 
the charred remains of his gutted garage, but not before they may hold him in 
indefinite involuntary isolation at the Nation’s border to investigate whether he 
might be engaged in criminal wrongdoing.” (alteration in original)); cf. United 
States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 561 (1976) (noting that privacy expec-
tations are less in a car than in one’s private dwelling). 
 154. See, e.g., New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 702–03 (1987); see also Al-
meida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 271 (1973) (“A central difference 
between [the business regulation] cases and this one is that businessmen en-
gaged in such federally licensed and regulated enterprises accept the burdens 
as well as the benefits of their trade, whereas the petition here was not engaged 
in any regulated or licensed business.”). 
 155. See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 351 (1985) (Blackmun, J., con-
curring) (setting forth three-part test for reasonableness of warrantless inspec-
tions of commercial properties); see also Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 
67, 81–83 (2001) (explaining that a hospital’s sharing of diagnostic tests for 
pregnant women with police not justified by special need even if the ultimate 
purpose is to protect the health of the mother and child); Michigan Dep’t. of 
State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 455 (1990) (holding that a sobriety checkpoint 
is a special law enforcement concern that justifies highway stop without any 
individualized suspicion). 
 156. See United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 616 (1977) (“That searches 
made at the border, pursuant to the long-standing right of the sovereign to pro-
tect itself by stopping and examining persons and property crossing into this 
country, are reasonable simply by virtue of the fact that they occur at the border, 
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the Trump administration, which sees detention as one of the 
only ways to deter illegal border crossers,157 who, in the view of 
many within the administration, are taking advantage of proce-
dural rights built into U.S. immigration law to stay in the U.S. 
while fighting against deportation.158 It is quite possible that de-
taining noncitizens who present themselves at the border or 
port-of-entry for no more than forty-eight hours in order to issue 
an expedited removal order would pass a reasonableness test un-
der the Fourth Amendment.159 However, seizing and jailing 
thousands of people suspected of immigration violations who are 
found anywhere within the interior of the U.S. is a far cry from 
the brief stops of vehicles or persons, which are justified when 
they occur at a checkpoint near the border or port-of-entry.160  
That may be true, but many have argued that the border 
has extended further inside of the perimeter of the U.S.161 In 
 
should, by now, require no extended demonstration.”); Martinez-Fuerte, 428 
U.S. at 552–53, 557 (finding that stops of motorists at permanent checkpoints 
near the border are justified by the important law enforcement concern of polic-
ing a southern border that is 2,000 miles long); Chacón, supra note 66, at 133; 
Anil Kalhan, The Fourth Amendment and Privacy Implications of Interior Im-
migration Enforcement, 41 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1137, 1190–91 (2008) (“The ‘bor-
der exception’ sits at the intersection of two established and much criticized ar-
eas of constitutional doctrine: the ‘plenary power’ doctrine and the various 
exceptions to ordinary Fourth Amendment requirements for primarily admin-
istrative, noncriminal searches and seizures. Both areas are highly deferential 
to government actions, and many of the criticisms of the deference extended in 
those areas apply with comparable force to the deference afforded the govern-
ment under the border exception.”). 
 157. See, e.g., Border Security Executive Order, supra note 20; Border Secu-
rity Implementation Memo, supra note 20.  
 158. See Philip Rucker & David Weigel, Trump Advocates Depriving Undoc-
umented Immigrants of Due-Process Rights, WASH. POST (June 25, 2018), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/powerpost/trump-advocates-depriving 
-undocumented-immigrants-of-due-process-rights/2018/06/24/dfa45d36-77bd 
-11e8-93cc-6d3beccdd7a3_story.html?noredirect=on&utm_term= 
.05c119748f4a [https://perma.cc/R9K3-TLDC]. 
 159. See United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531 541–43 
(1985) (permitting detention for sixteen hours at an international border based 
on reasonable suspicion by customs agents that she was smuggling contraband 
in her alimentary canal); Holper, supra note 15, at 938–39 (describing expedited 
removal procedures). 
 160. See United States v. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. 149, 152 (2004); Montoya 
de Hernandez, 473 U.S. at 533, 538; Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 557. 
 161. See Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 556 (“Our previous cases have recog-
nized that maintenance of a traffic-checking program in the interior is neces-
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fact, Daniel Kanstroom has categorized an entire class of depor-
tation cases as “extended border control” deportations.162 “Ex-
tended border control” deportations happen when the noncitizen 
has not been admitted to the U.S. or has been admitted but vio-
lates the rules that govern his temporary residence.163 In con-
trast, “post-entry social control” deportations involve noncitizens 
who have been admitted to the U.S., under a permanent or tem-
porary status, and are deportable because of criminal or political 
conduct—conduct that arose after they were admitted.164 If, at 
least in “extended border control” deportations, the government 
can cite to the “special need” of border control to justify immigra-
tion arrests and detention without the approval of a neutral 
judge,165 then a significant number of immigration arrests with-
out the involvement of a neutral judge would comply with the 
Fourth Amendment. The problem with this rationale is that it 
takes a Fourth Amendment doctrine that was intended to tip the 
balance of interests in favor of the government where govern-
mental power is at its “zenith”—at the international border166—
and applies it when the governmental power has dwindled—
within the interior of the U.S.167 Even one of the first cases in 
which the Supreme Court affirmed the “border exception” to the 
 
sary because the flow of illegal aliens cannot be controlled effectively at the bor-
der.”); Chacón, supra note 66, at 145 n.99 (citing to circuit court cases expanding 
the border search doctrine to searches occurring near the border and reasoning 
that although “quite modest, they demonstrate the malleability of the concept” 
(citing United States v. Yang, 286 F.3d 940, 949 (7th Cir. 2002); United States 
v. Ogbuehi, 18 F.3d 807, 813 (9th Cir. 1994))); see also Ayelet Shachar, The 
Shifting Border of Immigration Regulation, 3 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 165, 174 
(2007) (describing how expedited removal has allowed the border to become “de-
tached from its traditional location at the perimeter of the country’s edges . . . by 
relying on the legal fiction of removing unwanted migrants ‘at the border’ when 
they are already firmly within its perimeter”).  
 162. See DANIEL KANSTROOM, DEPORTATION NATION: OUTSIDERS IN AMERI-
CAN HISTORY 5 (2007). 
 163. Id. at 5. 
 164. Id. at 6. 
 165. See Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. at 541–43; Martinez-Fuerte, 428 
U.S. at 557. 
 166. United States v. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. 149, 152 (2004) (“The Gov-
ernment’s interest in preventing the entry of unwanted persons and effects is 
at its zenith at the international border.”). 
 167. See Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. at 538 (“[T]he Fourth Amend-
ment’s balance of reasonableness is qualitatively different at the international 
border than in the interior.”); United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 617–18 
(1977). 
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Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement, Almeida-Sanchez v. 
United States,168 limited the geographic scope of the border.169 In 
this sense, ICE agents who arrest and detain noncitizens for de-
portation are no different than police arresting persons upon 
suspicion of illegal conduct, and the decisions of these “zealous 
officers” must be checked by a “neutral and detached magistrate 
instead of being judged by the officer engaged in [enforce-
ment].”170 And, as the Court stated in Almeida-Sanchez, “[t]he 
needs of law enforcement stand in constant tension with the 
Constitution’s protections of the individual against certain exer-
cises of official power. It is precisely the predictability of these 
pressures that counsels a resolute loyalty to constitutional safe-
guards.”171  
Thus, the reasonableness of the seizures and subsequent de-
tentions for deportation should be made on a case-by-case ba-
sis172 and by a neutral judge. If the current immigration system 
lacks such truly neutral judges,173 as I argue in the next section, 
then the entire immigration detention system is regularly vio-
lating the Fourth Amendment rights of those caught in its in-
creasingly broad net.  
II.  THE NOT-SO-NEUTRAL IMMIGRATION JUDGE   
This Part demonstrates why the current immigration judges 
cannot systemically provide the “neutral judge” review required 
to authorize continued detention under the Fourth Amendment. 
While I recognize that there are many fair, impartial immigra-
tion judges, including before whom I have practiced, this anec-
dotal evidence cannot change the underlying structural issues 
that cause judges to rely on the DOJ for their professional liveli-
hoods, or the statutes and regulations in place that allow their 
 
 168. 413 U.S. 266 (1973). 
 169. See id. at 268 (holding that stop and search of automobiles without a 
warrant or probable cause violates Fourth Amendment when occurring twenty-
five miles from the border); Chacón, supra note 66, at 137 (“Almeida-Sanchez 
therefore can be read as an affirmation of the breadth of border search authority 
and a limitation on the geographic scope of this border exceptionalism.”). 
 170. See Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 112–13 (1975) (quoting Johnson v. 
United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13–14 (1948)). 
 171. Almeida-Sanchez, 413 U.S. at 273. 
 172. Cf. United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 564–66 (1976) (per-
mitting border checkpoint without issuance of an “area” warrant by a judge). 
 173. See infra Part II. 
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supposedly neutral detention decisions to be overridden by a 
DHS prosecutor. 
A. A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE COMMINGLED PROSECUTORIAL AND 
ADJUDICATIVE FUNCTIONS 
Administrative agencies, the “fourth branch of govern-
ment,”174 have had increasing broad power to carry out im-
portant functions of government, such as setting forth law, adju-
dicating cases, and prosecuting cases.175 Concern about agencies’ 
serious impacts on private rights with limited restraints, created 
a call for a uniform structure to agency decision-making.176 In 
the 1930s, the American Bar Association saw the undermining 
of the judicial branch by the creation of agencies.177 Advocates 
for reform had a choice between “bringing the resolution of con-
troversies back to the court system and bringing court rules to 
the administrative system”;178 and since the benefits of adminis-
trative adjudication were well-recognized at this point, “[t]he ef-
fort later turned from bringing administrative proceedings into 
a federal court system to bringing court standards into the ad-
ministrative proceedings.”179 
President Roosevelt created a Committee on Administrative 
Management, which reported its findings in 1937; the President 
also assigned the Attorney General to name a similar committee 
in 1939.180 After legislative hearings, at which all existing ad-
ministrative agencies were invited to submit their views,181 the 
 
 174. See Peter L. Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government: Separation 
of Powers and the Fourth Branch, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 573, 578 (1984) (describing 
the place of administrative agencies within the constitutional framework). 
 175. See id. at 578–59 (noting the acceptance of agencies who exercise judi-
cial, legislative, and executive functions but fall outside the three branches). 
 176. See Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33, 36–38 (1950) (discussing 
the growing concerns about agency power and the call to implement safe-
guards), superseded by statute, Supplemental Appropriation Act of 1951, Pub. 
L. No. 81-843, 64 Stat. 1044; see also Ardestani v. INS, 502 U.S. 129 (1991). 
 177. Won Kidane, The Inquisitorial Advantage in Removal Proceedings, 45 
AKRON L. REV. 647, 691 (2012). 
 178. Id.  
 179. Id. (quoting William H. Kuehnle, Standards of Evidence in Administra-
tive Proceedings, 49 N.Y. L. SCH. L. REV. 829, 843–44 (2004)). 
 180. Wong Yang Sung, 339 U.S. at 38. 
 181. Id. at 40. 
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Administrative Procedure Act (APA) was signed into law by 
President Truman in 1946.182 
Among other requirements, the APA provides for the sepa-
ration of the adjudicative and prosecutorial functions.183 Specif-
ically, the APA requires that an adjudicatory officer shall not “be 
responsible to or subject to the supervision or direction of an em-
ployee or agent engaged in the performance of investigative or 
prosecuting functions for any agency.”184 Also, “[a]n employee or 
agent engaged in the performance of investigative or prosecuting 
functions for an agency in a case may not, in that or a factually 
related case, participate or advise in the decision, recommended 
decision, or agency review . . . except as witness or counsel in 
public proceedings.”185 
Justifying the separation of functions, the President’s Com-
mittee on Administrative Management noted concerns when 
“[t]he discretionary work of the administrator is merged with 
that of the judge”186 because “[p]ressures and influences properly 
enough directed toward officers responsible for formulating and 
administering policy constitute an unwholesome atmosphere in 
which to adjudicate private rights.”187 The Committee also found 
that having one person serve as both prosecutor and judge “un-
dermines judicial fairness” and “weakens public confidence in 
that fairness.”188 Similarly, the Attorney General’s Committee 
on Administrative Procedure found that “commingling of func-
tions of investigation or advocacy with the function of deciding 
are . . . plainly undesirable” and thus recommended the creation 
 
 182. Id. at 40 (citing 92 CONG. REC. 6706 (1946)). 
 183. 5 U.S.C. § 554(d)(2) (2012). 
 184. Wong Yang Sung, 339 U.S. at 40. 
 185. Id. The APA language regarding separation of functions is largely the 
same as when the APA first was enacted in 1946. See id. at 35 n.1 (quoting 5 
U.S.C. § 5 (1946)). 
 186. Id. at 41–42 (quoting PRESIDENT’S COMM. ON ADMIN. MGMT., ADMINIS-
TRATIVE MANAGEMENT IN THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES 36–37 
(1937)). 
 187. Id. at 42. 
 188. Id.; see also Legomsky, War on Independence, supra note 6, at 390 
(“[T]he more a governmental function resembles legislation or other policymak-
ing, the more a representative democracy values political accountability over 
decisional independence. For that reason, it is only in the adjudication context—
not in the legislative or implementation contexts—that I claim a normative link 
between decisional independence and the rule of law.”). 
  
2020] IMITATION JUDGES 1309 
 
of independent hearing commissioners “insulated from all 
phases of a case other than hearing and deciding . . . .”189 
After the passage of the APA, the issue of whether deporta-
tion hearings complied with the APA’s required separation of ad-
judicatory and prosecutorial roles reached the Supreme Court in 
the 1950 case Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath.190 Mr. Sung had 
been ordered to be deported by a “presiding inspector,” who 
played the part of both prosecutor and judge.191 The Court wrote, 
“while he is today hearing cases investigated by a colleague, to-
morrow his investigation of a case may be heard before the in-
spector whose case he passes on today.”192 Deciding that the pro-
visions of the APA applied to deportation cases, the Court held 
that having the special inquiry officer serve both the role of pros-
ecutor and judge violated the APA’s provisions.193 Following 
“[t]he torpedo delivered by the 1950 Sung decision,”194 the INS 
made temporary appointments of APA Hearing Examiners, giv-
ing incumbent presiding inspectors such appointments.195 
Wong Yang Sung ’s effect in immigration law was short-
lived.196 The INS and the DOJ requested an exemption from APA 
 
 189. Wong Yang Sung, 339 U.S. at 44 (quoting S. DOC. NO. 77-8, at 56 (1941), 
ATT’Y GEN. COMM. ADMIN. PROCEDURE, REPORT 56 (1941)). 
 190. 339 U.S. 33. In 1940, there had been a study of the immigration proce-
dures by a committee named by the Secretary of Labor, who then had jurisdic-
tion over immigration matters; this study recommended that presiding inspec-
tors be relieved of their prosecutorial duties. See Wong Yang Sung, 339 U.S. at 
42–44 (quoting SEC’Y OF LABOR’S COMM. ON ADMIN. PROCEDURE, THE IMMIGRA-
TION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE 77 (mimeo. 1940)); see also id. at 44 (“A 
genuinely impartial hearing, conducted with critical detachment, is psychologi-
cally improbable if not impossible, when the presiding officer has at once the 
responsibility of appraising the strength of the case and of seeking to make it 
as strong as possible.” (citation omitted)).  
 191. Id. at 45. The regulations at the time prohibited the presiding inspector 
from being the one who investigated the case, unless the noncitizen consented. 
Id. (citing 8 C.F.R. § 150.6(b) (1949)). 
 192. Id. 
 193. Id. at 45–48. 
 194. Sidney B. Rawitz, From Wong Yang Sung to Black Robes, 65 INTER-
PRETER RELEASE 453, 456 (1988).  
 195. Id. 
 196. Id. 
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coverage, and Congress quickly delivered in a 1950 appropria-
tions bill.197 Two years later, Congress passed the 1952 McCar-
ran-Walter Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), which spe-
cifically exempted deportation proceedings from the APA’s 
requirements.198 The Court recognized this exemption in the 
1954 case of Marcello v. Bonds,199 reasoning that Congress had 
deliberately legislated deportation proceedings out of the APA’s 
hearing requirements.200 Mr. Marcello had received what was 
then termed a “two-man” hearing (unlike Sung ’s “one-man hear-
ing”),201 in which a special inquiry officer presided over his case, 
but a different immigration officer presented the evidence.202 
The presiding officer was subject to the supervision and control 
of officials within the prosecuting agency, however.203 The Court 
held that this arrangement did not violate his due process rights, 
“when considered against the long-standing practice in deporta-
tion proceedings, judicially approved in numerous decisions in 
the federal courts, and against the special considerations appli-
cable to deportation which the Congress may take into account 
in exercising its particularly broad discretion in immigration 
matters.”204 
With the 1952 INA, Congress buried the term “presiding in-
spector” and replaced it with “special inquiry officers.”205 The 
hiring process for special inquiry officers also changed in later 
years to give preference to holders of college and law degrees (in-
stead of those with border patrol experience, which was previ-
ously rewarded in hiring for INS officers).206 The DOJ continued 
to make small steps toward adjudicators’ independence, remov-
 
 197. Id. at 456–57; see also Supplemental Appropriations Act of 1951, ch. 
1052, 64 Stat. 1044, 1048 (1950). 
 198. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, ch. 477, sec. 403, § (a)(47), 66 
Stat. 163, 280. 
 199. 349 U.S. 302, 310 (1955). 
 200. Id. at 308–09. 
 201. See Rawitz, supra note 194, at 454 (discussing the differences between 
two-man hearings and one-man hearings). 
 202. Marcello, 349 U.S. at 306.  
 203. Id. at 311. 
 204. Id.  
 205. Rawitz, supra note 194, at 456–57. 
 206. Daniel Kanstroom, The Long, Complex, and Futile Deportation Saga of 
Carlos Marcello, in IMMIGRATION STORIES 113, 128 (David A. Martin & Peter 
H. Schuck eds. 2005); Rawitz, supra note 194, at 457. 
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ing special inquiry officers from INS District Director supervi-
sion and creating the position of Chief Special Inquiry Officer in 
1956.207 In every case where deportability was contested, it was 
required that there be a separate prosecutor and special inquiry 
officer, who would have his own file, in order to insulate the spe-
cial inquiry officer from the prejudicial contents of the prosecu-
tion’s file.208  
All immigration adjudicators continued to answer to the At-
torney General, although the Supreme Court interpreted regu-
lations enacted to accompany the 1952 INA as requiring the 
Board of Immigration Appeals (Board) to exercise independent 
judgment.209 In the 1954 case Accardi v. Shaughnessy, a noncit-
izen had been denied discretionary relief because he was on a list 
of “unsavory characters” issued by the Attorney General.210 The 
Court held that the Board failed to exercise its own independent 
discretion, pursuant to its regulation, and remanded the case.211 
On remand, however, the Board reached the same conclusion, 
which the Court found was free of undue influence by the Attor-
ney General.212 In Mr. Marcello’s case, the Attorney General 
publicly stated that Mr. Marcello was “undesirable” and “that 
the proceedings were specially designed to deport” him, and that 
his name was on a list that the Attorney General desired to de-
port.213 Yet, the Supreme Court found that there was no specific 
evidence that the Board prejudged his claim and thus the Board 
had in fact engaged in the exercise of independent judgment.214 
So, while this “independent judgement” regulation has existed 
on paper, enforcing some internal version of separating adjudi-
cators from policymakers,215 as demonstrated by these two Su-
preme Court cases, it is not very meaningful in practice. 
 
 207. Rawitz, supra note 194, at 458. 
 208. Kanstroom, supra note 206, at 128; Rawitz, supra note 194, at 458. 
 209. United States ex rel. Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 347 U.S. 260 (1954). 
 210. Id. at 264. 
 211. Id. at 267–68. 
 212. Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Accardi, 349 U.S. 280, 282–83 
(1955).  
 213. Marcello v. Bonds, 349 U.S. 302, 312 (1955). 
 214. Id. at 312–14. 
 215. See Kim, supra note 30, at 42 (“[T]he [Accardi] holding can be under-
stood as promoting a version of internal separation of powers.”); see also id. at 
10–12 (describing different functions of an agency, which including adjudicative 
or quasi-adjudicative, legislative or quasi-legislative, and purely ministerial). 
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In 1983, the adjudicators were officially moved out of the 
INS, with the creation of the Executive Office for Immigration 
Review (EOIR).216 The new EOIR housed the Board and the now-
titled “immigration judges,” a title that began in 1973, with the 
practice of wearing robes in the courtroom.217 However, the At-
torney General was still the boss of both the immigration judges 
and the Board.218 Also, the Supreme Court in 1991 affirmed that 
Marcello holding, notwithstanding the creation of the EOIR, and 
held that deportation proceedings were still not “adversary ad-
judications” under the APA.219  
There also arose separate procedures within immigration 
law for sanctioning employers, which came about in the late 
1980’s. The introduction of employer penalties into immigration 
law with the 1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act220 saw a 
new model of adjudication, now that the questions were no 
longer concerning the rights of “aliens” but also U.S. citizen em-
ployers were subject to sanctions for illegally hiring undocu-
mented workers.221 There has been little criticism of this dis-
jointed system of administrative procedures within the INA, 
 
 216. Board of Immigration Appeals; Immigration Review Function; Editorial 
Amendments, 48 Fed. Reg. 8056 (Feb. 25, 1983) (to be codified at 28 C.F.R. 
pt. 0). 
 217. Rawitz, supra note 194, at 458. 
 218. Board of Immigration Appeals; Immigration Review Function; Editorial 
Amendments, 48 Fed. Reg. at 8056. 
 219. In the 1991 case of Ardestani v. INS, the Court affirmed the Marcello 
holding that deportation proceedings were exempted from the APA, holding that 
there could be no award of attorneys’ fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act 
for prevailing in a deportation hearing, because such a hearing was not techni-
cally an “adversary adjudication” under the APA. 502 U.S. 129, 133–34, 139 
(1991). The Court in Ardestani made such a holding notwithstanding the prom-
ulgation of the 1983 regulations that created the EOIR, which the Court de-
scribed as “conform[ing] deportation hearings more closely to the procedures 
required for formal adjudication under the APA.” Id. at 134.  
 220. Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 
Stat. 3359. For a summary of the legislative history leading up to the employer 
sanctions provisions of IRCA, see Michael Wishnie, Prohibiting the Employment 
of Unauthorized Immigrants: The Experiment Fails, 2007 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 193 
(2007). 
 221. Immigration Reform and Control Act § 274A(e)(1)(A)(4). The employer 
sanction provisions of IRCA led to the creation of the Office of Chief Hearing 
Administrative Hearing Officer (OCAHO) within the EOIR, which employs 
ALJs appointed pursuant to the APA. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.0 (2019); 28 C.F.R. 
§§ 44.100, 68.26 (“Hearings shall be held before an Administrative Law Judge 
appointed under 5 U.S.C. § 3105 and assigned to the Department of Justice.”). 
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where the business owner gets a hearing before a “real” admin-
istrative law judge222 and the noncitizen gets an “imitation 
judge.”223 This would seem to be one more example of where, as 
Jack Chin has noted, “administrative procedure tends to offer 
greater protection to businesses than to individuals.”224 Admin-
istrative law scholar Paul Verkuil, defending this disparate 
treatment, stated, 
  The decider independence issue is especially sensitive in the con-
text of employer sanctions. Whereas there is little doubt that the im-
migration judge structure satisfies the due process standards of inde-
pendence for decisions about aliens, the structure must be examined 
more closely when those normally outside the reach of the system are 
to be brought within it.225 
B. THE “WAR ON INDEPENDENCE” IN THE POST-9/11 ERA  
In response to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, 
Congress in 2002 created the DHS, which would house all func-
tions of the former INS, including prosecutorial functions.226 As 
a result of this legislation, which went into effect in 2003, immi-
gration prosecutors no longer worked within the same agency as 
the adjudicators.227 Yet, scholars and the National Association of 
 
OCAHO judges are authorized to sanction employers who have engaged in un-
fair immigration-related employment practices and illegally hired workers; they 
also can issue civil penalties for document fraud. See 8 C.F.R. §§ 270.1–.3 (de-
fining document fraud and describing procedures to enforce civil sanctions); 8 
C.F.R. § 274A.9 (defining procedures for administrative sanctions against em-
ployers who knowingly illegally hire undocumented workers); 28 C.F.R. 
§ 44.200 (defining unfair immigration-related employment practices).  
 222. See William Funk, The Rise and Purported Demise of Wong Yang Sung, 
58 ADMIN. L. REV. 881, 883 (2006) (describing the Wong Yang Sung Court’s con-
cern with the “embodiment in one person or agency the duties of prosecutor and 
judge,” which was remedied by the APA’s creation of ALJs, then called hearing 
examiners, as well as providing for the separation of functions in 5 U.S.C. 
§ 554(d)). 
 223. See Slavin & Harbeck, supra note 6, at 70. 
 224. Gabriel J. Chin, Regulating Race: Asian Exclusion and the Administra-
tive State, 37 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 4 (2002). 
 225. Paul Verkuil, A Study of Immigration Procedures, 31 UCLA L. REV. 
1141, 1195 (1984). 
 226. Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2136. 
 227. The explanatory notes to the implementing regulations state, “[t]his 
rule is also a step in the process of separating DHS enforcement and services 
functions from Department of Justice adjudication functions as envisioned by 
the Act.” Authority of the Secretary of Homeland Security; Delegations of Au-
thority; Immigration Laws, 68 Fed. Reg. 10,922, 10,922 (Mar. 6, 2003). 
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Immigration Judges noted that such changes did not fully evis-
cerate a fundamental truth: that judges are housed within the 
DOJ, “an agency that is closely aligned with the DHS and shares 
its primary mission of law enforcement rather than objective ad-
judication.”228 As Gerald Neuman has observed, “[t]he Attorney 
General . . . and other political appointees in the Justice Depart-
ment are politically accountable for their success in creating the 
reality or appearance of border control, in general or in well-pub-
licized cases.”229 The simultaneous “war on terror” caused the 
DOJ to step up enforcement efforts within immigration law.230  
At the same time that Congress officially separated the im-
migration prosecutors from adjudicators with the Homeland Se-
curity Act, the Attorney General began what Stephen Legomsky 
has called a “war on independence” of the EOIR adjudicators.231 
He outlines three types of constraints that executive or legisla-
tive actors can impose on the authority of the adjudicator: the 
substitution of a general rule for individualized adjudication or 
judgment; a decision by an executive or administrative official to 
intervene in a pending case; and a threat of personal conse-
quences to adjudicators, including reassignment to a less desir-
able position, nonrenewal of appointment, or loss of compensa-
tion, if they do not reach a certain type of outcome. In his article, 
he focuses on the third type of decisional independence.232 
In 2002, not long after the National Association of Immigra-
tion Judges had issued a proposal for an independent court, the 
Attorney General published a final rule that reduced the size of 
 
 228. Leigh Marks, Still a Legal Cinderella, supra note 6, at 29. 
 229. Gerald L. Neuman, Habeas Corpus, Executive Detention, and the Re-
moval of Aliens, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 961, 1024 (1998). 
 230. See Stella Burch Elias, “Good Reason to Believe”: Widespread Constitu-
tional Violations in the Course of Immigration Enforcement and the Case for 
Revisiting Lopez-Mendoza, 2008 WIS. L. REV. 1109, 1135 (2008) (noting how the 
“war on terror” led to the radical changes in immigration enforcement); Jennifer 
M. Chacón, A Diversion of Attention? Immigration Courts and the Adjudication 
of Fourth and Fifth Amendment Rights, 59 DUKE L.J. 1563, 1571–73 (2010) (dis-
cussing how federal immigration enforcement is expanding). 
 231. See Legomsky, War on Independence, supra note 6, at 370 (“As hyper-
bolic as the title of this Article might sound, I submit it is accurate to depict the 
sum of these various measures as an all-out war on the very notion of decisional 
independence in the adjudication of immigration cases.”).  
 232. Id. at 387–88. The automatic stay described in Part II.C is an example 
Legomsky cites of a substitution of a general rule for an individualized determi-
nation, which undermines judges’ independence. Id. 
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the Board.233 This caused Board members who had ruled most 
frequently in favor of immigrants to be reassigned to non-adju-
dicative positions within the Department;234 data also showed 
that in the one-year period following this announcement but be-
fore the reassignments, Board members began to rule less fre-
quently against the government.235 Another study showed that 
after the reassignments, outcomes in Board cases were signifi-
cantly less favorable to immigrants.236 In response to concerns 
that the reassignments were punishment for ruling against the 
government, the DOJ responded: 
Each Board member is a Department of Justice Attorney who is ap-
pointed by, and may be removed or reassigned by, the Attorney Gen-
eral. All attorneys in the Department are excepted employees, subject 
to removal by the Attorney General, and may be transferred from and 
to assignments as necessary to fulfill the Department’s mission.237 
The DOJ provided no real explanation for the study’s findings, 
thus confirming fears that an adjudicator can be re-assigned to 
a non-adjudicative position as a form of reprimand.238 These re-
assignments marked the first time in the Board’s history that an 
Attorney General had removed a member.239 
The 2002 final DOJ rule also identified a different degree of 
independence by the Board.240 Until 2002, a regulation stated 
that “Board Members shall exercise their independent judgment 
 
 233. Id. at 373–74. See also infra note 340 (discussing various proposals that 
have been suggested).  
 234. Legomsky, War on Independence, supra note 6, at 376 (“Data compiled 
by Peter Levinson, a long-time member of the legal staff of the House Judiciary 
Committee, show that the axe fell entirely on the most ‘liberal’ members of the 
BIA, as measured by the percentages of their rulings in favor of noncitizens.” 
(citing Peter J. Levinson, The Facade of Quasi-Judicial Independence in Immi-
gration Appellate Adjudications, 9 BENDER’S IMMIGR. BULL. 1154, 1164 (2004))). 
 235. Id. at 377 (citing Levinson, supra note 234, at 1159–60). 
 236. Legomsky, Restructuring Immigration Adjudication, supra note 6, at 
1670 (citing DORSEY & WHITNEY LLP, STUDY CONDUCTED FOR THE AMERICAN 
BAR ASSOCIATION’ COMMISSION ON IMMIGRATION POLICY, PRACTICE AND PRO 
BONO RE: BOARD OF IMMIGRATION APPEALS: PROCEDURAL REFORMS TO IM-
PROVE CASE MANAGEMENT app. 24 (2003), http://files.dorsey.com/files/Upload/ 
DorseyStudyABA.pdf). 
 237. Board of Immigration Appeals: Procedural Reforms to Improve Case 
Management, 67 Fed. Reg. 54,878, 54,893 (Aug. 26, 2002) (to be codified at 8 
C.F.R. pt. 3). 
 238. See Legomsky, War on Independence, supra note 6, at 374–75 (discuss-
ing how the changes have further heightened apprehensions). 
 239. Id. at 379. 
 240. Id.; Levinson, supra note 234, at 1161. 
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and discretion in cases coming before the Board.”241 The new rule 
rearranged the priorities, stating that “Board members shall be 
attorneys appointed by the Attorney General to act as the Attor-
ney General’s delegates in the cases that come before them”;242 
only later does a “diluted version” of the decision independence 
language appear.243 Stephen Legomsky noted that although the 
reassignments impacted only Board members, “the reference to 
‘[a]ll attorneys’ makes clear that the attorney general intended 
the quoted language to apply to immigration judges as well.”244 
In the current administration, former Attorney General Sessions 
reminded immigration judges of their subservient role in carry-
ing out the Trump administration’s priorities of having “zero il-
legal immigration in this country.”245  
In 2006, Attorney General Gonzales announced a system of 
performance evaluations for each immigration judge and Board 
member.246 Regulations went into effect in 2007 which made ex-
plicit the legal authority to establish such a performance evalu-
ation system, without any input or public disclosure of the pro-
cedures or criteria for determining what constitutes good 
 
 241. Legomsky, War on Independence, supra note 6, at 379 (quoting 8 C.F.R. 
§ 3.1(a)(1) (2002)). 
 242. Id. (quoting 8 C.F.R. § 3.1(a)(1), (d)(1)(ii) (2003)). 
 243. Id. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(1)(ii) (2019) (“Subject to these governing 
standards, Board members shall exercise their independent judgment and dis-
cretion in considering and determining the cases coming before the 
Board . . . .”). 
 244. Legomsky, Restructuring Immigration Adjudication, supra note 6, at 
1670. 
 245. As Catherine Kim writes, in remarks during the EOIR’s Legal Training 
Program, Sessions asserted, “[a]ll of us should agree that, by definition, we 
ought to have zero illegal immigration in this country,” and reminded IJs in 
attendance that they must “conduct designated proceedings ‘subject to such su-
pervision and shall perform such duties as the Attorney General shall pre-
scribe.’” Kim, supra note 30, at 22 (quoting Jefferson Sessions, U.S. Attorney 
Gen., Remarks to the Executive Office for Immigration Review Legal Training 
Program in Washington, D.C. (June 11, 2018)). 
 246. See Margaret H. Taylor, Refugee Roulette in an Administrative Law 
Context: The Déjà Vu of Decisional Disparities in Agency Adjudication, 60 STAN. 
L. REV. 475, 496 (2007) (citing Press Release, U.S. Dep’t. of Justice, Attorney 
General Alberto R. Gonzales Outlines Reforms for Immigration Courts and 
Board of Immigration Appeals (Aug. 9, 2006), http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/ 
2006/August/06_ag_520.html [https://perma.cc/EBU4-HZ85]).  
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“performance.”247 Legomsky writes that the combined effect of 
the reassignments of Board members, adjusted “independence” 
regulations, and performance evaluations “remind surviving and 
future BIA members and immigration judges that they hold 
their jobs at the discretion of one of the opposing parties in the 
cases that come before them.”248 Regardless of how much faith 
one might have in a current Attorney General to not malevo-
lently use reassignments and bad performance evaluations 
against an individual adjudicator, he writes, “adjudicators can 
never again feel confident ruling against the government in 
close, controversial, or high-visibility cases.”249 
Another affront to immigration judges’ decisional independ-
ence came with “case completion goals,” which the DOJ formally 
implemented in 2002.250 Although the scheduling of a case does 
not, at first glance, appear to seriously constrain a judge’s inde-
pendence, time limits tend to favor the government251 because it 
can take time to both become eligible for relief from removal 
(since a petition can be pending with a different agency such as 
the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services) and develop pos-
itive discretionary factors.252 For detainees, the set case comple-
tion goal of ninety days253 can present a roadblock to getting an 
attorney, obtaining corroborating documents, and providing ex-
pert testimony, all of which are key to helping the detainee 
 
 247. Id. (citing Authorities Delegated to the Director of the Executive Office 
for Immigration Review, and the Chief Immigration Judge, 72 Fed. Reg. 53,673, 
53,675 (Sept. 20, 2007) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. pts. 1003, 1240)). 
 248. Legomsky, Restructuring Immigration Adjudication, supra note 6, at 
1671. 
 249. Id. at 1677. 
 250. As a result of requirements imposed by the Government Performance 
and Results Act of 1993, the Department of Justice had to quantify achieve-
ments and accountability. The DOJ chose to establish “adjudication priorities” 
for the Immigration Court and elected to measure its success by evaluating 
whether courts met these case-completion goals. Slavin & Marks, supra note 6, 
at 1787 n.13 (citing U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-06-771, EXECU-
TIVE OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW CASELOAD PERFORMANCE REPORTING 
NEEDS IMPROVEMENT 20–21 (Aug. 2006)). 
 251. See Kim, supra note 30, at 32. 
 252. See id.  
 253. Memorandum from Michael J. Creppy, Chief Immigration Judge, 
EOIR, to all Immigration Judges et al., Case Completion Goals (Apr. 26, 2002), 
http://www.aila.org/infonet/ocij-describes-case-completion-goals [https://perma 
.cc/B3JD-TQ3E]. 
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win.254 Many have critiqued the DOJ’s management of judges’ 
caseloads as an example of DOJ’s undue influence over judges.255 
Case completion goals were implemented by court and at first 
were not imposed on individual judges,256 yet evidence demon-
strated that individual judges felt the impact of these goals, cit-
ing them in decisions that denied continuances to noncitizens.257 
Although the EOIR publicly stated that case completion goals 
would not impact individual judges for failure to comply,258 a 
2008 study concerning immigration judge burnout revealed a 
common perception that these case goals were mandatory.259 Im-
migration judges reported that the goals created a work environ-
ment where they are unable to adjudicate cases fairly and inde-
pendently.260  
Today, early critics of case completion goals have seen their 
fears play out. Former Attorney General Sessions referred to 
himself a case involving the authority to grant continuances, re-
quiring judges to factor in both “administrative efficiency” (case 
completion goals) and DHS objections when deciding whether to 
grant continuances to noncitizens whose applications for relief 
are pending before different agencies.261 In announcing this pol-
icy, he reversed portions of the Board’s 2009 decision in Matter 
of Hashmi that specifically prohibited judges from citing to case 
 
 254. See, e.g., Ingrid V. Eagly & Steven Shafer, A National Study of Access 
to Counsel in Immigration Court, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 6–10 (2015) (presenting 
statistics from an empirical study that demonstrated that detainees were five 
times less likely to obtain representation than nondetained respondents, and 
without representation, were more likely to lose their cases and be deported). 
 255. See, e.g., APPLESEED, supra note 6, at 1 (“The sharp increase in the 
number of cases in Immigration Courts over the past decade, without a corre-
sponding increase in resources, lies at the root of many of these problems.”). 
 256. See Slavin & Marks, supra note 6, at 1787. 
 257. See id. at 1788. 
 258. See Statement, supra note 6, at 7. 
 259. See Slavin & Marks, supra note 6, at 1787–88; see also Stuart L. Lustig 
et al., Inside the Judges’ Chambers: Narrative Responses from the National As-
sociation of Immigration Judges Stress and Burnout Survey, 23 GEO. IMMIGR. 
L.J. 57, 64–65 (2008) (quoting one immigration judge, who stated, “[w]hat is 
required to meet the case completions is quantity over quality”). 
 260. Lustig et al., supra note 259, at 64–65; see also Slavin & Marks, supra 
note 6, at 1787 (“In the Immigration Court System, these ‘goals’ have become 
an undue and sometimes unseen pressure on an immigration judge’s ability to 
render a thorough, well-reasoned decision.”). 
 261. See In re L-A-B-R-, 27 I. & N. 405, 415–17 (A.G. 2018).  
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completion goals when deciding whether to continue a case,262 
which the Board decided after a reprimand from the Third Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals.263 In a similar effort to speed up deporta-
tions without regard to pending applications for relief, Sessions 
directed immigration judges to no longer use the tool of admin-
istrative closure to take a case off a judge’s docket while an ap-
plication was pending before a different agency.264  
More controversially, Sessions proposed individual produc-
tion quotas on immigration judges, which would impact judges’ 
performance evaluations if a judge failed to comply.265 Under 
this metric, immigration judges would be required to complete 
700 cases a year, have a remand rate by the Board or circuit 
court of under 15%, and meet at least half of a list of performance 
benchmarks related to completing certain types of cases within 
strict deadlines.266 According to a statement of the President of 
the National Association of Immigration Judges before Congress 
in April 2018, this “unprecedented move . . . violates every tenet 
of an independent court and judges . . . .”267 With these changes, 
 
 262. Id.  
 263. See In re Hashmi, 24 I. & N. 785, 793–94 (A.G. 2009) (“Compliance with 
an Immigration Judge’s case completion goals . . . is not a proper factor in de-
ciding a continuance request, and Immigration Judges should not cite such 
goals in decisions relating to continuances.”). The Immigration Judge in 
Hashmi had denied a motion to continue to a noncitizen who had an application 
pending before the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services. Id. at 786–87. 
When the Board originally upheld that denial, the Third Circuit, on appeal, held 
that the decision was “impermissibly arbitrary” because it relied on case com-
pletion goals, which the court stated “should not be read as an end in themselves 
but as a means to prompt and fair dispositions, giving due regard to the unique 
facts and circumstances of the case.” Hashmi v. Att’y Gen., 531 F.3d 256, 261 
(3d Cir. 2008). 
 264. In re Castro-Tum, 27 I. & N. 271, 281 (A.G. 2018), abrogated by Romero 
v. Barr, 937 F.3d 282 (4th Cir. 2019). 
 265. Memorandum from Jefferson B. Sessions, III, U.S. Attorney Gen., to 
Adjudicative Employees, EOIR Performance Plan (Mar. 30, 2018), http://cdn 
.cnn.com/cnn/2018/images/04/02/immigration-judges-memo.pdf [https://perma 
.cc/6ACV-DPVU]. This memorandum was sent to immigration judges on March 
30, 2018. See Tal Kopan, Justice Department Rolls Out Case Quotas for Immi-
gration Judges, CNN POLITICS (Apr. 2, 2018, 8:55 PM), https://www.cnn.com/ 
2018/04/02/politics/immigration-judges-quota/index.html [https://perma.cc/ 
WHV6-9SRM].  
 266. See Sessions, supra note 265. 
 267. Statement, supra note 6, at 7; see also Betsy Woodruff, New Quotas for 
Immigration Judges Are “Incredibly Concerning,” Critics Warn, DAILY BEAST 
(Apr. 2, 2018, 6:58 PM), https://www.thedailybeast.com/new-quotas-for 
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Sessions fulfilled one of the Trump administration’s stated con-
cerns of deterring illegal immigration to the U.S., since the DOJ 
publicly stated that the backlog in immigration proceedings is 
attributed to discretionary grants of removal, which “have 
slowed down the adjudication . . . and incentivized further illegal 
immigration . . . .”268  
In 2008, concern over the political hiring of immigration 
judges caused a Congressional committee to examine these 
claims.269 DOJ former liaison to the White House, Monica Good-
ling, testified before the U.S. House Judiciary Committee that, 
from 2004–2006 the DOJ and White House had appointed immi-
gration judges based on their Republican Party affiliations or 
conservative political views, bypassing the usual procedures.270 
While these concerns righted themselves in response to this Con-
gressional inquiry,271 the concerns appear to have reemerged in 
the DOJ’s recent hiring of immigration judges to clear up the 
714,000 case backlog.272 In this process, there have been allega-
tions that candidates’ applications were either stalled or rejected 
“based on their perceived political or ideological views.”273 The 
 
-immigration-judges-are-a-recipe-for-disaster-critics-warn?ref=scroll [https:// 
perma.cc/6UUQ-LQS3] (“Critics of the move say it will result in speedier depor-
tations of asylum-seekers, robbing them of due process.”). 
 268. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Backgrounder on EOIR Strategic 
Caseload Reduction Plan (Dec. 6, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/opa/press 
-release/file/1016066/download [https://perma.cc/3HEA-F4A9]. 
 269. See OFFICE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY & OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., 
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, AN INVESTIGATION OF ALLEGATIONS OF POLITICIZED 
HIRING BY MONICA GOODLING AND OTHER STAFF IN THE OFFICE OF THE ATTOR-
NEY GENERAL (2008) [hereinafter GOODLING POLITICIZED HIRING], https://oig 
.justice.gov/special/s0807/final.pdf [https://perma.cc/F9J3-QXE7]. 
 270. Legomsky, Restructuring Immigration Adjudication, supra note 6, at 
1665–66 (citing GOODLING POLITICIZED HIRING, supra note 269, at 70–71). 
 271. See id. at 1666 (discussing the Attorney General’s 2007 new immigra-
tion judge appointment process in which EOIR would again play a dominant 
role). 
 272. Tom Dart, Jeff Sessions Accused of Political Bias in Hiring Immigration 
Judges, THE GUARDIAN (June 16, 2018, 6:59 PM), https://www.theguardian 
.com/us-news/2018/jun/16/jeff-sessions-political-bias-hiring-immigration 
-judges [https://perma.cc/BX4L-QCCY]. 
 273. Id.; see also Tal Kopan, Immigration Judge Applicant Says Trump Ad-
ministration Blocked Her over Politics, CNN POLITICS (June 21, 2018, 10:40 
AM), https://www.cnn.com/2018/06/21/politics/immigration-judge-applicant 
-says-trump-administration-blocked-her-over-politics/index.html [https:// 
perma.cc/Q3ZV-QTZV]; Legomsky, Restructuring Immigration Adjudication, 
supra note 6, at 1689 (“The tawdry hiring practices that so badly tarnished 
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renewed allegations of political bias in hiring immigration 
judges has caused congressional Democrats to request more in-
formation from the DOJ.274 
C. THE UNDERMINING OF IMMIGRATION JUDGE INDEPENDENCE 
IN BOND DECISIONS 
This Section illustrates two examples of how the immigra-
tion bond system does not ensure a fair and neutral hearing, 
again undermining judges’ independence. Thus, even though im-
migration judges often make individualized decisions about 
flight risk and dangerousness,275 potentially releasing an immi-
gration detainee for the remainder of removal proceedings, that 
decision can be unilaterally undone by a DHS prosecutor. As 
background, it is important to note that INS officials had long 
expressed disdain for immigration judges,276 viewing them “as 
pushy intruders whose demands in the name of due process only 
obstruct the Service mission.”277 Not long after the EOIR’s crea-
tion, the INS publicly expressed the desire to take bond decisions 
away from EOIR adjudicators.278 The INS had become increas-
ingly frustrated by judges reducing their bonds, and thus INS 
General Counsel announced at a conference for immigration law-
yers that he desired to eliminate all immigration judge and 
 
EOIR and other components of the Department of Justice have since been cor-
rected, but without congressional action, nothing prevents future Justice De-
partments and White House officials from lapsing.”). 
 274. See Letter from Elijah E. Cummings et al., Members of Cong., to Jeff 
Sessions, U.S. Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice (Apr. 17, 2018). 
 275. By statutes and regulation, the following detainees have no right to a 
bond hearing: those removable for several types of crimes or terrorism; detain-
ees who have arrived at a port of entry and have not been admitted; and detain-
ees who already have been ordered removed. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1225(b), 1226(c), 
1231(a) (2012); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.19 (2019).  
 276. The district directors of INS delivered testimony before the Select Com-
mission on Immigration and Refugee Policy, which proposed an Article I immi-
gration court in its 1981 report. Fuchs, supra note 6, at 438–43 . In the opinion 
of a consultant to the Commission, the INS “view[ed] the present role of immi-
gration judges negatively,” asserting that immigration judges made “simple” 
hearings needlessly complex, and even referred to their robes as “the black 
nightgowns they frequently wear when conducting hearings.” Levinson, supra 
note 6, at 646 & n.17 (citing Memorandum, Assoc. of Immigration Dirs.’ Confer-
ence with Comm’r Castillo (Dec. 14, 1977)).  
 277. Roberts, supra note 6, at 8–9. 
 278. Janet Gilboy, Setting Bail in Deportation Cases: The Role of Immigra-
tion Judges, 24 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 347, 395 (1987). 
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Board review of INS bond decisions.279 In a white paper to the 
INS regarding its detention strategies in 1997, Peter Schuck 
noted these disparities between INS and immigration judge 
bonds, and recommended that the Deputy Attorney 
“adopt . . . policies designed to better coordinate bonding deci-
sions and to impose departmental priorities and policies on 
EOIR as well as the INS.”280 
A 2001 interim regulation expanded the DHS’s authority to 
unilaterally override an immigration judge’s release order by fil-
ing a piece of paper indicating the intent to appeal such deci-
sion.281 First adopted in 1998, the “automatic stay” was created 
as an override to an immigration judge’s release of a noncitizen 
who was subject to laws that required either presumptive or 
mandatory detention because they were deportable for certain 
criminal convictions.282 Attorney General John Ashcroft ex-
panded this authority in 2001 in an interim regulation, which he 
passed quickly without comment in the wake of the September 
11, 2001 terrorist attacks.283 The INS trial attorney could invoke 
this authority in any case where the INS in its original custody 
determination set no bond or a minimum bond of $10,000.284 No 
longer was the authority limited to those who, because of a crim-
inal conviction, were deemed presumptively dangerous by the 
agency.285 Thus the INS could essentially determine the outcome 
of a bond hearing before an immigration judge by setting an ini-
tial bond of at least $10,000 or no bond, allowing its prosecutors 
to later invoke the automatic stay and hold someone in detention 
regardless of the IJ’s ruling.286 
 
 279. See id. 
 280. Schuck, supra note 99, at 683–84. 
 281. 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.6(c), .19(i)(2), (2019).  
 282. Procedures for the Detention and Release of Criminal Aliens and for 
Custody Redeterminations, 63 Fed. Reg. 27,441 (May 19, 1998) (to be codified 
at 8 C.F.R. pts. 3, 236). For a comprehensive review of the history of the man-
datory detention statutes, see Margaret H. Taylor, Demore v. Kim: Judicial Def-
erence to Congressional Folly, in IMMIGRATION STORIES (David A. Martin & Pe-
ter H. Schuck, eds., 2005).  
 283. Review of Custody Determinations, 66 Fed. Reg. 54,909 (Oct. 31, 2001) 
(to be codified at 8 C.F.R. pt. 3). 
 284. Id. at 54,910. 
 285. See Procedures for the Detention and Release of Criminal Aliens and 
for Custody Redeterminations, 63 Fed. Reg. at 27,447. 
 286. See Zabadi v. Chertoff, No. C 05-01796 WHA, 2005 WL 1514122, at *1–
2 (N.D. Cal. June 17, 2005) (holding that the regulation “impermissibly merges 
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The final rule was issued in 2006 after a notice-and-com-
ment period, in which modest changes were made to the final 
rule, none of which addressed concerns over IJ independence.287 
Responding to comments that the automatic stay undermined 
 
the functions of adjudicator and prosecutor” and that it is “ultra vires” as it 
“eliminates the discretionary authority of immigration judges to determine 
whether an individual may be released, thereby exceeding the authority be-
stowed”); Ashley v. Ridge, 288 F. Supp. 2d 662, 671 (D.N.J. 2003) (quoting Cole, 
supra note 118, at 1031 (reasoning that the automatic stay “produces a patently 
unfair situation by tak[ing] the stay decision out of the hands of the judges al-
together and giv[ing] it to the prosecutor who has by definition failed to per-
suade a judge in an adversary hearing that detention is justified”)). Some ha-
beas courts found most problematic the creation of a new class of mandatory 
detention by allowing such an override of the judge’s discretionary release deci-
sion. See, e.g., Zavala v. Ridge, 310 F. Supp. 2d 1071, 1079 (N.D. Cal. 2004) (“The 
regulation . . . has the effect of mandatory detention of a new class of aliens, 
although Congress has specified that such individuals are not subject to man-
datory detention.”); Almonte-Vargas v. Elwood, No. CIV.A. 02-CV-2666, 2002 
WL 1471555, at *4 (E.D. Pa. June 28, 2002) (describing the automatic stay as 
“accomplishing Petitioner’s mandatory detention” by allowing the trial attorney 
to override the judge’s release order). One court found the regulations to be un-
lawful because there was no time limitation on the length of detention pursuant 
to the stay authority. See Bezmen v. Ashcroft, 245 F. Supp. 2d 446, 450 (D. 
Conn. 2003). 
 287. The final rule set a time limit on the duration of the automatic stay, 
providing that it would expire in ninety days if the Board did not decide the 
appeal of the bond decision. Review of Custody Determinations, 71 Fed. Reg. 
57,873, 57,874 (Oct. 2, 2006) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. pts. 1003.6(c), .19(i)(2)). 
However, as Raha Jorjani has observed, the “‘90-day limit’ of the new regula-
tions can be dangerously deceptive,” as DHS can then seek a discretionary stay 
(a procedure that is less one-sided in that the detainee has had the opportunity 
to argue in support of release), continuing detention for up to thirty days, and 
the stay can remain in effect for an additional five and up to fifteen days should 
DHS seek Attorney General review (plus tolling of the time limits should the 
noncitizen need more time for briefing). Raha Jorjani, Ignoring the Court’s Or-
der: The Automatic Stay in Immigration Detention Cases, 5 INTERCULTURAL 
HUM. RTS. L. REV. 89, 106–07 (2010). The final rule also requires that a super-
visory DHS officer sign off on the automatic stay filing, and that DHS certify 
that there is factual and legal support for its position. Review of Custody Deter-
minations, 71 Fed. Reg. at 57,874; see also Jorjani, supra, at 104–05 (arguing 
that the final rule did not adequately address early courts’ rulings, such as in 
Zabadi, 2005 WL 1514122, at *2, and Zavala, 310 F. Supp. at 1078, because 
“the regulations are tantamount to permitting DHS to adjudicate the identical 
legal issue that it is prosecuting before an independent authority” because “the 
regulations require only that DHS approve its own legal strategy”); id. at 106 
(noting that in order for there to be factual and legal support, the regulation 
permits DHS to rely on legal arguments that are contrary to binding precedent, 
which “permits DHS to detain immigrants without bond by relying on principles 
that have been previously rejected by courts”). 
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the IJ’s independence, the EOIR characterizes immigration 
judges and immigration prosecutors (who at that point were 
housed within DHS) as all acting together, carrying out the At-
torney General’s “broad authority” to detain and release a 
noncitizen on bond pending a decision to deport.288 And, as a re-
minder of the history of comingled functions, the EOIR cited to 
the Supreme Court’s holding in Marcello v. Bonds that permitted 
the combination of adjudicative and investigative roles in the 
former INS.289 
 
 288. Review of Custody Determinations, 71 Fed. Reg. at 57,877 (“Under 
longstanding provisions of the Immigration and Nationality Act, the Attorney 
General has had broad detention authority . . . . Now, after enactment of the 
HAS, the Secretary of Homeland Security exercises that discretion in carrying 
out the detention and enforcement authority formerly administered by the INS, 
and the Attorney General and his delegates (the Board and the immigration 
judges) exercise that discretion in the review of the custody decisions initially 
made by DHS.”); see also id. at 57,879 (“[T]he INA places no restrictions on the 
Attorney General’s or the Secretary [of DHS]’s discretion to prescribe proce-
dures for the adjudication of bond requests by aliens during removal proceed-
ings, and agencies are generally afforded great latitude in organizing them-
selves internally and in developing procedures for carrying out their 
responsibilities.”). 
 289. Id. at 57,880 (citing Marcello v. Bonds, 349 U.S. 301, 311 (1955)). Once 
the final regulation went into effect, which set a time limit of ninety days on the 
duration of detention under the automatic stay, many habeas courts were not 
able to reach a decision on the legal challenge because the Board had already 
exercised its discretionary stay authority. See, e.g., Altayar v. Lynch, No. 
CV1602479PHXGMSJZB, 2016 WL 7383340, at *4–6 (D. Ariz. Nov. 23, 2016) 
(holding that the automatic stay had converted to discretionary stay by the time 
of decision, and discretionary stay authority did not violate due process because 
of opportunity for each party to brief issues). Of those courts that reached the 
issue, however, the views of the respective role of judges and prosecutors in bond 
hearings differed from the views held by earlier courts. For example, a federal 
district court in the Eastern District of Wisconsin critiqued other courts’ hold-
ings that the automatic stay provision was unconstitutional, characterizing 
such courts’ decisions as “based on a misunderstanding of the relationship be-
tween DHS, the IJs, and the BIA, and their respective roles in exercising the 
authority of the Attorney General to make custody determinations in cases in-
volving the removal of aliens.” Hussain v. Gonzales, 492 F. Supp. 2d 1024, 1032 
(E.D. Wis. 2007). On appeal to the Seventh Circuit, the issue concerning the 
constitutionality of the alien’s detention had become moot. Hussain v. Mukasey, 
510 F.3d 739, 742–43 (7th Cir. 2007); see also Altayar, 2016 WL 7383340, at *4 
(reasoning in dicta that the automatic stay did not violate due process, and rea-
soning that “a stay of some length is afforded precisely because it allows the 
Government an opportunity to appeal before a detainee might flee”). 
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Scholars have critiqued the automatic stay as an attack on 
immigration judges’ independence.290 Immigration Judge Dana 
Leigh Marks describes the automatic stay regulation as “th[e] 
improper ability by one party virtually to guarantee its desired 
outcome in bond proceedings,” which is part of a larger “trend 
favoring enforcement priorities.”291 As Judge Marks notes, “With 
one party retaining such a great legal advantage, it is under-
standable that the public finds the current arrangement to be 
mere window-dressing and doubts the impartiality of the Immi-
gration Courts.”292  
A second affront to immigration judges’ independence in 
bond decisions is the statutory authority that DHS has to rear-
rest a noncitizen, even after a prior release by an immigration 
judge, without justifying the rearrest to an immigration judge.293 
The statute and implementing regulation do not, on their face, 
require DHS to prove any changed circumstances prior to a re-
arrest.294 The breadth of the language suggests that as soon as a 
noncitizen has won a bond hearing and been released, DHS may 
detain that person for any reason whatsoever, thus undermining 
the bond hearing before the supposedly neutral immigration 
judge. What is more, DHS need not even go through the steps of 
filing the automatic stay in the requisite time period, or seeking 
a discretionary stay, or writing an appeal to the Board. The au-
thority certainly rewards the DHS attorney who has missed a 
deadline, either the one business-day deadline for the automatic 
 
 290. See Cole, supra note 118, at 1031 (“[T]he regulation takes the stay de-
cision out of the hands of the judges altogether . . . .”); Jorjani, supra note 287, 
at 100 (noting, for instance, that “a release order cannot be executed until the 
BIA has made a final decision on the custody appeal, despite an individualized 
determination by the Immigration Judge . . . .”).  
 291. Leigh Marks, An Urgent Priority, supra note 6, at 12. 
 292. Id. 
 293. See 8 U.S.C. § 1226(b) (2012) (“The Attorney General at any time may 
revoke a bond or parole authorized under subsection (a), rearrest the alien un-
der the original warrant, and detain the alien.”). 
 294. Id.; 8 C.F.R. § 236.1(c)(9) (2019) (“When an alien who, having been ar-
rested and taken into custody, has been released, such release may be revoked 
at any time in the discretion of the district director, acting district director, dep-
uty district director, assistant district director for investigations, assistant dis-
trict director for detention and deportation, or officer in charge (except foreign), 
in which event the alien may be taken into physical custody and detained. If 
detained, unless a breach has occurred, any outstanding bond shall be revoked 
and canceled.”). 
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stay or the thirty-day deadline for a typical appeal,295 or who 
does not feel like writing a brief to the Board arguing against the 
IJ’s release decision.296 
The earliest example of the rearrest authority appears to be 
for those whose orders of deportation could not be effectuated 
because, due to World War I, borders had shifted, rendering 
many people stateless.297 The statute required their deportation 
on the vessels that brought them.298 Recognizing that is was un-
realistic to effectuate all deportations pursuant to the statute, 
the implementing rules permitted release if “prompt deportation 
cannot be accomplished because of war or other conditions.”299 
Upon receiving permission from the immigration agency, a de-
portable noncitizen could be released and permitted to accept 
self-supporting employment under conditions set forth in the 
rules.300 The rules required employers to set out a scheme of 
work for the detainee and to pay a portion of the wages to the 
immigration service as security against absconding.301 The de-
tainee could be taken back into custody if the work finished and 
there was no more, if he violated conditions of release, misbe-
haved, or failed to obey the laws, whether federal or state.302 Ac-
cording to Daniel Wilshire, who has chronicled the history of 
U.S. immigration detention,  
They were subject to extraordinary controls and powers of re-arrest not 
linked to the possibility of deportation or criminal charges. They were 
“reauthorized” [having become “unauthorized” by virtue of their depor-
tation orders], but remained virtually at the mercy of the executive in 
ways that would be unconstitutional if applied to lawful residents or 
citizens.303 
 
 295. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.19(i). 
 296. Id.  
 297. DANIEL WILSHIRE, IMMIGRATION DETENTION: LAW, HISTORY, POLITICS 
32 (2012). 
 298. The Immigration Act of 1917 stated that, “all aliens brought to this 
country in violation of the law shall be immediately sent back . . . to the country 
whence they respectively came, on the vessels bringing them, unless in the opin-
ion of the Secretary of Labor immediate deportation is not practicable or 
proper.” Id. at 32 (citing Immigration Act of 1917, Pub. L. No. 64-301, § 18, 39 
Stat. 874, 887–89 (repealed 1952)).  
 299. Id. (citing Immigration Laws (Act of February 9, 1917) – Rules of May 
1, 1917, Rule 17A(1)).  
 300. Id. 
 301. Id. 
 302. Id. (citing Rules 17A(2)–(3), (5)). 
 303. Id.  
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The rearrest authority later appeared in the statute govern-
ing detention pending deportation proceedings, where the de-
tainee’s right to be in the U.S. had not yet been extinguished.304 
Since the earliest challenges, courts have found that such rear-
rest must pass review for abuse of discretion, suggesting that 
immigration officials can only rearrest based on new evidence.305 
Yet, Congress subsequently took away federal courts’ jurisdic-
tion to review the exercise of discretion in bond decisions,306 leav-
ing even that limitation on the rearrest authority open to abuse 
without oversight by the judiciary. The Board also examined the 
rearrest authority in the 1981 case Matter of Sugay.307 There the 
original bond amount of $50,000 was reduced by the IJ to 
 
 304. See, e.g., Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, Pub. L. 82-414, 
§ 242(a), 66 Stat. 163, 209 (“But such bond or parole, whether heretofore or 
hereafter authorized, may be resolved at any time by the Attorney General, in 
his discretion, and the alien may be returned to custody under the warrant 
which initiated the proceedings against him and detained until final determi-
nation of his deportability.”). 
 305. For example, in Carlson v. Landon, one of the noncitizens arrested for 
deportation argued that his rearrest pursuant to the new Internal Security Act 
of 1950, after his previous release under bond on the same warrant, with no 
proof of changed circumstances, was an abuse of the Attorney General’s discre-
tion. 342 U.S. 524, 534 (1952). The Court held that “[a]lthough in a civil pro-
ceeding for deportation the same branch of government issues and executes the 
warrant, we think the better practice is to require in those cases also a new 
warrant.” Id. at 546. The Ninth Circuit, interpreting Carlson, permitted the re-
arrest of a noncitizen under the 1952 statutory authority to not be an abuse of 
the Attorney General’s discretion when the noncitizen engaged in “continued 
and undenied” communist activity in the period before he was retaken into cus-
tody. Ocon v. Landon, 218 F.2d 320, 326 (9th Cir. 1954). Similarly, the D.C. 
Circuit prohibited a noncitizen’s rearrest unless there were “adequate reasons 
for making the arrest”; the court reasoned that “[n]either appellant’s criminal 
record nor his unpopularity justifies imprisoning him.” Rubinstein v. Brownell, 
206 F.2d 449, 456 (D.C. Cir. 1953). The Second Circuit interpreted the rearrest 
authority and held, “[W]e cannot construe the statute to give the Attorney Gen-
eral unbridled license to exercise his discretion as to detention in whatever ar-
bitrary or capricious way he might see fit, provided only that he act with rea-
sonable dispatch to obtain a decision as to the alien’s deportability.” United 
States ex rel. Yaris v. Esperdy, 202 F.2d 109, 111–12 (2d Cir. 1953). 
 306. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(e) (2012). 
 307. Sugay, 17 I. & N. 637, 639 (BIA 1981) (quoting 8 C.F.R. § 242.2(c) 
(1980)) (“When an alien who, having been arrested and taken into custody, has 
been released, such release may be revoked at any time in the discretion of the 
district director . . . , in which event the alien may be taken into physical cus-
tody and detained.”). 
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$20,000; after the noncitizen’s applications for relief were de-
nied, the INS District Director elected to revoke the IJ’s $20,000 
bond and set a $30,000 bond. Responding to a challenge that the 
regulation “undermine[d] the impartial and independent deci-
sion of the immigration judge,”308 the Board responded that the 
noncitizen always has recourse to appeal the new custody deci-
sion by INS to the immigration judge, and then to the Board.309 
Also, the Board directed that “no change should be made by a 
District Director absent a change of circumstances.”310  
Although Matter of Sugay is a restraint on DHS’s otherwise 
extremely broad authority to rearrest,311 it does not go far 
enough to protect immigration judges’ independence in deciding 
bond. There is no requirement that DHS must promptly prove 
the changed circumstances to a judge; thus, a noncitizen could 
suffer a significant amount of detention until the government 
must justify the change in circumstances to override the prior 
release order. Currently, a district court order protects the na-
tion-wide class of unaccompanied minors who are rearrested by 
mandating that DHS prove changed circumstances within seven 
days of rearrest;312 however, there is no comparable case extend-
ing that requirement to immigration detainees who are over the 
age of eighteen.313 What is more, the regulations governing bond 
hearings require that if a detainee loses a bond hearing and then 
 
 308. Id. at 639. 
 309. Id. at 639–40. 
 310. Id. at 640. In the case, the Board found that there was a sufficient 
change of circumstances, namely: (1) new evidence, which included a certified 
conviction record for murder in the Philippines (at the first bond hearing, the 
government had presented this fact, but their records were not certified or au-
thenticated); and (2) that the noncitizen had been denied relief and ordered de-
ported by the IJ. Id. at 638.  
 311. Id.  
 312. Saravia v. Sessions, 280 F. Supp. 3d, 1168, 1195–96 (N.D. Cal. 2017) 
(ordering government to prove changed circumstances for unaccompanied mi-
nors who were released from the custody of the Office of Refugee Resettlement 
to sponsors and then later, upon DHS’ belief that the minors were gang-in-
volved, were placed back into government custody based on a finding of danger-
ousness, without justifying such redetention to a judge), aff’d, 905 F.3d 1137 
(9th Cir. 2018). 
 313. Anyone over the age of eighteen is subject to adult detention, governed 
by 8 U.S.C. § 1226 (2012) (unlike the detention of unaccompanied minors, which 
is governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1232). See William Wilberforce Trafficking Victims 
Protection Reauthorization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-457, § 235, 122 Stat. 
5044, 5074–82. 
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seeks another bond hearing because of changed circumstances, 
he must file a request in writing; this regulation also requires 
that the detainee show a “material” change in circumstances.314 
Advocates representing noncitizens in bond hearings might won-
der why they do not have similar authority as DHS, allowing 
them to unilaterally release their clients if they can prove to 
themselves that there is a change in circumstances. Such a sug-
gestion seems absurd, and yet it is just the flipside of the author-
ity that DHS has to unilaterally overrule a supposedly “neutral” 
immigration judge decision. 
D. IMMIGRATION DETENTION AS “DIFFERENT” FROM OTHER 
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW  
In the wake of the 2002 Homeland Security Act, Former INS 
General Counsel David Martin defended the Attorney General’s 
supervision of immigration adjudicators.315 He argued that im-
migration “may implicate particularly sensitive foreign policy 
dealings or law enforcement decisions,” so that “immigration pol-
icy may have to adapt quickly in response to events. . . . For 
these reasons, . . . all relevant decisions where law is interpreted 
and policy set, including adjudications, should ultimately be un-
der the authority of a Cabinet official, who has wider horizons 
and more immediate political accountability than the usual in-
dependent tribunal.”316 From a management perspective, he hy-
pothesizes a situation where a massive influx of migrants come 
to the border; in this situation the Attorney General could deploy 
not only enforcement officers but also immigration judges.317  
Martin’s concern for foreign policy is an example of what Pe-
ter Schuck calls “classical immigration law,”318 which “sanc-
tioned a system of adjudication in which the hierarchy of legiti-
mate legal succession is completely reversed. Here, where 
sovereignty confronts strangers, the Constitution can be subor-
 
 314. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.19(e) (2019). 
 315. David A. Martin, Immigration Policy and the Homeland Security Reau-
thorization Act: An Early Agenda for Practical Improvements, INSIGHT Apr. 
2003, at 18. 
 316. Id. 
 317. Id. 
 318. Schuck, supra note 124, at 5–34. 
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dinated to a congressional statute, indeed, to mere administra-
tive practice.”319 Martin’s defense of the current immigration ad-
judication structure views immigration decisions as only impli-
cating foreign policy concerns when, in fact, immigration 
enforcement involves the lives of individual people who have in-
dividual rights under the Constitution, especially when the gov-
ernment takes away their physical liberty.320 Questions of phys-
ical liberty have historically been viewed by common law courts 
as deserving of special concern, and separate from national se-
curity questions.321 
Martin’s defense of the current structure also does not ac-
count for the ways in which courts have failed to treat questions 
of physical liberty in the immigration context as run-of-the-mill 
administrative law decisions, which normally would deserve def-
erence under the Supreme Court’s decision in Chevron U.S.A. 
Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council.322 Alina Das and Mi-
chael Kagan both note various examples where courts have ap-
plied this “liberty” exception to Chevron deference, albeit with-
out courts explicitly acknowledging the creation of such an 
exception.323 The “physical liberty” exception is one of a growing 
number of “immigration” exceptions to Chevron deference for 
which scholars are advocating.324 
 
 319. Id. at 33–34. 
 320. See supra Part I. 
 321. See Daniel Wilsher, Whither the Presumption of Liberty? Constitutional 
Law and Immigration Detention, in CHALLENGING IMMIGRATION DETENTION: 
ACADEMICS, ACTIVISTS AND POLICY-MAKERS 66, 72–78 (Michael J. Flynn & Mat-
thew B. Flynn eds., 2017). 
 322. 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
 323. See Alina Das, Unshackling Habeas Review: Chevron Deference and 
Statutory Interpretation in Immigration Detention Cases, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 143, 
154–58, 177–80, 188–99 (2015); Michael Kagan, Chevron’s Liberty Exception, 
104 IOWA L. REV. 491, 533–35 (2019). 
 324. See, e.g., Rebecca Sharpless, Zone of Nondeference: Chevron and Depor-
tation for a Crime, 9 DREXEL L. REV. 323, 330 (2017) (arguing that Chevron 
deference should not apply when the statutory interpretation question involves 
deportation for a criminal conviction); Michael Kagan, Chevron’s Immigration 
Exception, Revisited, YALE J. ON REG.: NOTICE & COMMENT (June 10, 2016), 
http://yalejreg.com/nc/chevron-s-immigration-exception-revisited-by-michael 
-kagan/ [https://perma.cc/4PXC-8TW5]; Michael Kagan, Does Chevron Have an 
Immigration Exception?, YALE J. ON REG: NOTICE & COMMENT (May 19, 2016), 
http://yalejreg.com/nc/does-chevron-have-an-immigration-exception-by-michael 
-kagan/ [https://perma.cc/454C-QSHU]; see also Bassina Farbenblum, Executive 
Deference in U.S. Refugee Law: Internationalist Paths Through and Beyond 
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As this Part has explained, the immigration system has long 
lacked a truly neutral judge; even when an immigration judge 
decides to release a detainee during removal proceedings, that 
judge does not exercise complete independence. The Trump ad-
ministration has made every effort to undermine immigration 
judges’ independence, leading some judges to retire in protest.325 
The system thus regularly violates noncitizens’ Fourth Amend-
ment rights because there is no neutral judge authorizing their 
detention during removal proceedings. 
III.  PROPOSED SOLUTION   
In this Article, I propose that a federal magistrate judge 
promptly review all immigration arrests by ensuring that there 
is probable cause to remove the person in order to continue pre-
trial detention. Parts I and II have outlined why immigration 
detainees possess such rights and why immigration judge review 
does not suffice to protect these important Fourth Amendment 
rights. This Part considers several additional questions about 
whether such a proposal is truly warranted, realistic, and suffi-
cient to address the identified legal problems. 
First, does the system already provide for Article III judge 
review, in that a detainee can bring a habeas corpus petition in 
federal district court?326 Vindicating the widespread Fourth 
Amendment violations described in this Article through individ-
ual habeas corpus petitions is a near-impossible task. To begin, 
it may be strategically unwise for an immigration detainee to 
raise the immigration judge’s lack of neutrality before the fed-
eral court since the detainee risks offending the judge who may 
later be deciding discretionary relief in immigration court. Also, 
an individual habeas corpus petition is time-consuming, and de-
 
Chevron, 60 DUKE L.J. 1059 (2011) (questioning the role of Chevron deference 
in asylum cases, where legal standards are governed by international treaty 
obligations). 
 325. See Aleaziz, supra note 34 (“The timing of my retirement was a direct 
result of the draconian policies of the Administration, the relegation of [judges] 
to the status of ‘action officers’ who deport as many people as possible as soon 
as possible with only token due process . . . .” (alteration in original) (quoting 
former immigration judge John Richardson)). 
 326. See 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (2012). In such situations, all parties can consent 
to a magistrate conducting the proceeding, which is a civil proceeding. See 28 
U.S.C. § 636(c)(1). 
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tainees rarely have court-appointed counsel for such a legal bat-
tle.327 For those who are fortunate enough to have counsel in the 
deportation case, that attorney may choose not to spend time lit-
igating the habeas challenge when the client now faces an expe-
dited hearing on the merits of the deportation case.328 Hours 
spent preparing a habeas petition are frequently wasted, as fed-
eral district courts may not reach a decision on the merits of the 
detention while the detainee is still fighting the deportation 
case.329 An amicus curiae brief filed in a habeas appeal330 pre-
sented statistics from the District of Massachusetts that showed 
an average of 130 days to resolve a habeas petition with some 
averaging 408 days; this length of time operates to moot many 
petitions.331  
 
 327. See Holper, supra note 15, at 969. 
 328. See id. at 965–69. 
 329. E.g., Hussain v. Mukasey, 510 F.3d 739, 743 (7th Cir. 2007). For exam-
ple, several habeas corpus cases challenging the automatic stay regulation have 
been dismissed as moot, because the authority for the detention transferred be-
fore the habeas court could reach resolution of the issue. See supra Part II.C. 
Some cases are dismissed because an appeal challenging the detainee’s custody 
is still before the Board, which has jurisdiction to consider statutory challenges 
and discretionary decisions regarding bond in an interlocutory appeal. 8 C.F.R. 
§ 1003.19(f) (2019). Although exhaustion of administrative remedies is not stat-
utorily required, habeas courts cite the doctrine of prudential exhaustion to dis-
miss habeas petitions where legal challenges to detention are before the Board. 
See, e.g., Maldonado-Velasquez v. Moniz, Case No. 1:16-cv-11890-RGS (D. Mass. 
Nov. 8, 2016). But see Figueroa v. McDonald, No. 18-10097-PBS, 2018 WL 
2209217, at *3 (D. Mass. May 14, 2018) (holding that appeal to the BIA of im-
proper burden allocation would be futile because the Board already had decided 
the issue in a published case and that the Board does not have jurisdiction to 
decide constitutional issues and therefore any constitutional claims need not be 
exhausted).  
 330. Brief of Amicus Curiae Am. Immigration Lawyers Ass’n in Support of 
Appellant & Reversal, Maldonado-Velasquez v. Moniz, No. 17-1918 (1st Cir. 
Mar. 22, 2018). In a case challenging the unlawful burden allocation that a de-
tainee must bear in his immigration bond hearing, the American Immigration 
Lawyers Association submitted an amicus brief to encourage the court to reach 
the burden allocation argument, id. at 15, even though the District Court had 
not reached the issue because it decided the detainee was not prejudiced by the 
burden allocation. Maldonado-Velasquez, No. 17-1918, at 1.  
 331. See Maldonado-Velasquez, No. 17-1918, at 1–2 (dismissing a detention 
challenge because it became moot by virtue of the detainee receiving a final or-
der of removal from the Board of Immigration Appeals). 
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Challenging unlawful immigration detention practices 
through class actions presents its own set of challenges.332 Alt-
hough litigating on behalf of a class can address the mootness 
concerns, Congress in 1996 sought to severely limit the use of 
immigration class actions.333 When class action litigators pre-
sented convincing arguments to bypass such perceived bars to 
class action litigation,334 the Supreme Court in 2018 asked the 
lower court to decide whether a class was the best way to decide 
a due process challenge to prolonged detention during deporta-
tion proceedings.335  
Second, there is a practical concern that with the number of 
immigration arrests increasingly growing (158,581 in fiscal year 
2018),336 magistrate judges will not be able to keep up with the 
demand. Magistrate judges’ time is already taken up by the pri-
oritization of criminal cases, which must be given priority be-
cause of the time requirements of the Speedy Trial Act.337 Yet, 
this is a question of funding for the judicial branch of govern-
ment; should more magistrate judges be required, more funding 
 
 332. See, e.g., Chacón, supra note 230, at 1631 (discussing court ruling bar-
ring class actions of patterns or practices of due process violations, which 
“threaten[s] one of the most effective means noncitizens have to challenge ille-
galities in immigration law and procedures” (citing Aguilar v. ICE, 510 F.3d 1 
(1st Cir. 2007))). 
 333. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(f)(1) (1996) (“Regardless of the nature of the action or 
the claim or the identity of the party or parties bringing the action, no court 
(other than the Supreme Court) shall have jurisdiction or authority to enjoin or 
restrain the operation of [§§ 1221–31], other than with respect to the application 
of such provisions to an individual alien against whom proceedings under such 
part have been initiated.”). 
 334. See, e.g., Rodriguez v. Hayes, 591 F.3d 1105, 1119–20 (9th Cir. 2010). 
The Ninth Circuit in Rodriguez reasoned that 8 U.S.C. § 1252(f)(1) did not bar 
class-wide relief because: (1) this statutory provision only barred temporary in-
junctions, not permanent injunctions or declaratory relief; and (2) “1252(f) pro-
hibits only injunction of ‘the operation of’ the detention statutes, not injunction 
of a violation of the statutes.” Id. (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1252(f)). 
 335. Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. 830, 851–52 (2018). 
 336. U.S. IMMIGRATIONS & CUSTOMS ENF’T, FISCAL YEAR 2018 ICE EN-
FORCEMENT AND REMOVAL OPERATIONS REPORT 2 (2018), https://www.ice.gov/ 
doclib/about/offices/ero/pdf/eroFY2018Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/RVR4 
-75PE].  
 337. See Peter G. McCabe, A Guide to the Federal Magistrate System, FED. 
BAR ASS’N 43–45 (Aug. 2014), http://www.fedbar.org/PDFs/A-Guide-to-the 
-Federal-Magistrate-Judge-System [https://perma.cc/55HG-E7H4] (last up-
dated Oct. 2016). 
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can be appropriated for that purpose.338 Also, the concern of over-
burdening federal magistrates with authorizing needless deten-
tions may be a reason for ICE to more carefully choose which 
persons it chooses to detain for removal proceedings, instead of 
assuming that all noncitizens are presumptively flight risks or 
dangerous.339 Placing a “Fourth Amendment logjam” on ICE’s 
detention machine does not, after all, interfere with ICE’s ability 
to investigate and deport persons they believe to be in violation 
of the immigration laws.340 To the extent that ICE believes a 
“Fourth Amendment logjam” will cause many persons who have 
“no right to be here” to be free within the United States, that 
very question—whether someone has the right to be in the 
United States—is precisely the question that should be deter-
mined by a neutral judge before extended pretrial detention can 
occur. 
Third, is magistrate judge review for probable cause suffi-
cient, as they are not Article III judges? In the federal criminal 
system, magistrate judges regularly review whether there is 
probable cause to continue pretrial detention when police have 
arrested someone without probable cause; they also regularly is-
sue arrest warrants.341 Magistrate judges are assigned duties by 
Article III district court judges; the jurisdiction they exercise is 
that of the District Court itself, as they are not an administrative 
agency or separate Article I court.342 Indeed, the Supreme Court 
in Gerstein anticipated review for probable cause by a “neutral 
 
 338. See id. at 14 (noting the “slow but steady increase in the number of full-
time [magistrate judge] positions over the years” was “partly the result of in-
creased district court caseloads, but due also to the increasing delegation of a 
broad range of additional judicial duties by the district courts”). But see id. (dis-
cussing the perilous “financial state of the federal judiciary – resulting from 
several years of inadequate appropriations and the damaging effects of Con-
gressional sequesters”). 
 339. See Mark Noferi, Mandatory Detention for U.S. Crimes: The Noncitizen 
Presumption of Dangerousness, in IMMIGRATION DETENTION, RISK AND HUMAN 
RIGHTS 215, 227–32 (Maria João Guia et al. eds., 2016). 
 340. See, e.g., Morales v. Chadbourne, 793 F.3d 208, 218 (1st Cir. 2015) (rea-
soning that ICE officials can go about their work determining whether someone 
has violated the immigration laws; they must, however, let the person out of jail 
while they undertake such investigation if they have not proven probable cause 
to detain). 
 341. See McCabe, supra note 337, at 23, 26–27. 
 342. See id. at 2. 
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and detached magistrate”343 to fulfill a criminal defendant’s 
Fourth Amendment rights. 
Fourth, one could argue that questions of removability are 
best left to the expert immigration judges, not federal magistrate 
judges. Yet, a closer look reveals that federal magistrate judges 
do in fact handle questions of removability. As prosecutions for 
illegal entry and reentry have become increasingly more com-
mon,344 federal judges no doubt are familiar with immigration 
law and what constitutes presence in violation of the law.345 
Magistrate judges, although not trying cases of reentry, which is 
a felony,346 regularly issue arrest warrants based on probable 
cause347 that a person who has been ordered removed is found in 
the U.S. or authorizing continued detention.348  
Magistrate judges certainly have more expertise in what is 
“probable cause,” because that term does not exist in the immi-
gration statute and regulations. Although certain immigration-
specific terms like “reason to believe”349 have been interpreted to 
be the rough equivalent of probable cause,350 it is not a typical 
immigration term of art. In contrast, a federal magistrate who 
reviews warrants would be very familiar with the concept of 
probable cause.351  
As for questions that arise from removability based on crim-
inal convictions, it should be noted that the same analysis for 
removability based on a criminal conviction applies when a fed-
eral court applies a variety of sentencing provisions that rely on 
 
 343. Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 112–13 (1975). 
 344. Immigration Prosecutions for February 2018, TRANSACTIONAL REC-
ORDS ACCESS CLEARINGHOUSE (Mar. 26, 2018), https://trac.syr.edu/tracreports/ 
bulletins/immigration/monthlyfeb18/fil/ [https://perma.cc/66QQ-ANDH].  
 345. See 8 U.S.C. § 1325(a) (2012) (prohibiting unlawful entry to the U.S.); 
id. § 1326(a) (prohibiting unlawful reentry to the U.S. or be found in the U.S. 
after having been deported, ordered removed, or denied admission). 
 346. See McCabe, supra note 337, at 59. 
 347. See id. at 23; see also FED. R. CRIM. P. 4(a), 5. 
 348. See 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a). 
 349. E.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(C) (prohibiting an alien who is inadmissible 
because the consular officer or the Attorney General has “reason to believe” is a 
drug trafficker from obtaining a visa or eligibility to be admitted to the U.S.). 
 350. Alexa C. McDonnell, Reason To Believe: Satisfying the Standard of 
Proof of Section 212(a)(2)(C)(i), IMMIGR. L. ADVISOR, May–June 2011, at 6, 10, 
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/eoir/legacy/2011/07/06/vol5no5.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/W7LW-ACKR].  
 351. See McCabe, supra note 337, at 23. 
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prior convictions for certain categories of offenses.352 Although 
district courts, not magistrate judges, apply this analysis in fel-
ony sentencing,353 many magistrate judges later become district 
court judges.354 Thus, magistrate judges could benefit from the 
practice of applying the categorical approach when the issue to 
be determined is whether there is probable cause that someone 
is removable for a criminal conviction. Magistrate judges also 
may assess the strength of a particular detainee’s arguments 
against removal in the context of deciding an immigration ha-
beas corpus petition.355 
Fifth, there are proposals that could provide the requisite 
neutrality of immigration adjudicators without involving federal 
magistrate judges. For example, others have proposed an Article 
I court, or an independent agency within the DOJ, staffed by Ad-
ministrative Law Judges (ALJ).356 As other scholars have noted, 
 
 352. See, e.g., Jennifer Lee Koh, The Whole Better than the Sum: A Case for 
the Categorical Approach to Determining the Immigration Consequences of 
Crime, 26 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 257, 269 (2012). 
 353. See McCabe, supra note 337, at 29. 
 354. Id. at 16 (“[M]any magistrate judges have been rewarded by eventual 
promotion to an Article III judgeship.”). 
 355. See, e.g., Muse v. Sessions, No. 18-CV-0054 (PJS/LIB), 2018 WL 
4466052, at *3–6 (D. Minn. Sept. 18, 2018) (applying multi-factor test for 
whether mandatory detention without bond hearing violates due process and, 
as part of the test, assessing the likelihood that the removal proceedings will 
result in a final order of removal); Sajous v. Decker, No. 18-CV-2446 (AJN), 2018 
WL 2357266, at *10–11 (S.D.N.Y. May 23, 2018) (applying multi-factor test for 
whether mandatory detention without a bond hearing violates due process and, 
as part of the test, assessing any arguments detainee has made against re-
moval). 
 356. See supra note 6 and accompanying text. Following the INA, congres-
sional committees, scholars, the private bar, and immigration judges have 
called for more independence in the immigration adjudication system. See supra 
note 6 and accompanying text. In 1981, a Select Commission on Immigration 
and Refugee Policy wrote a report with 100 recommendations for President 
Reagan; one of the changes recommended was the creation of an Article I Im-
migration Court to “upgrade the entire process of adjudication in exclusion and 
deportation cases.” Fuchs, supra note 6, at 438, 443. The National Association 
of Immigration Judges also has called for Congress to create an Article I court, 
citing the Tax Court as a successful example of impartial adjudication. See, e.g., 
Leigh Marks, An Urgent Priority, supra note 6, at 15. Immigration scholar and 
former Chief Counsel to the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services Stephen 
Legomsky proposed the conversion of immigration judges into administrative 
law judges (ALJs), and moving them from the Department of Justice to a new, 
independent executive branch tribunal; he explained the contours of this system 
  
2020] IMITATION JUDGES 1337 
 
however, neither ALJ review nor the creation of Article I courts 
has provided the anticipated decisional independence of the ad-
judicators.357 Also, an independent executive branch agency 
would need to jockey for funds from Congress each year; this is 
easier when their decisions involve politically popular causes 
 
as well as its advantages and disadvantages in a 2010 article. Legomsky, Re-
structuring Immigration Adjudication, supra note 6, at 1710–14, 1721. The 
American Bar Association (ABA) in 2010 completed a lengthy report on the im-
migration adjudication system, reviewing extensive literature on the topic and 
interviewing scholars, judges, and practitioners. See AM. BAR ASS’N, supra note 
6. The ABA considered three possible models: an Article I court, an independent 
agency within the Executive Branch, and a hybrid model. Id. at 6–9. The ABA 
recommended an Article I court as the preferred option among the three because 
it would be a wholly judicial body, likely “to engender the greatest level of con-
fidence in its results, [could] use its greater prestige to attract the best candi-
dates for judgeships, and offers the best balance between independence and ac-
countability to the political branches.” Id. at 6–35. As a second choice, the ABA 
recommended the independent agency model, which “would be an enormous im-
provement over the current system and offers a strong alternative if the Article 
I court is deemed infeasible or unacceptable to Congress and/or the President.” 
Id. at 6–36. 
 357. E.g., Jill E. Family, Beyond Decisional Independence: Uncovering Con-
tributors to the Immigration Adjudication Crisis, 29 U. KAN. L. REV. 541, 549–
50, 550 n.54 (2011); Taylor, supra note 246, at 485. Jill Family critiques the 
Article I model for reforming the immigration system, citing the congressional 
decision to create an independent Article I court for the adjudication of veterans’ 
benefits, which did not provide the anticipated panacea of decisional independ-
ence. Family, supra at 549–50. She also cites several law review articles that 
critique the pro-government bias by the Tax Court, which is another example of 
an agency created as an independent tribunal, to illustrate that creating an in-
dependent tribunal does not always create completely independent adjudica-
tors. Id. at 550 n.54. Similarly, Margaret Taylor, recognizing the many calls for 
an independent immigration agency, responded with the example of the social 
security disability benefits system, which saw a similar transformation that did 
not provide the full decisional independence hoped for by reformers. Taylor, su-
pra note 246, at 485–90. She notes that “ALJ independence all but extinguishes 
an agency’s authority over hiring, firing, and supervision of its ALJs, but gives 
an agency control—according to whatever administrative appeal or quality as-
surance procedures the agency might establish—over ALJ decisions.” Id. at 485. 
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like veterans’ benefits; a politically unpopular cause such as im-
migration adjudication would fare much worse.358 Further, in re-
sponse to a recent Supreme Court ruling,359 a July 2018 Execu-
tive Order has changed the appointment process for ALJs, whose 
appointment processes will now be controlled by agency heads 
instead of the less political Office of Personnel Management.360 
Critics have raised concerns that this will lead to more political 
hiring of ALJs,361 reflecting the same concerns over political hir-
ing for immigration judges.362 Thus, even ALJs are not com-
pletely free from the political process—not enough to ensure a 
truly neutral judge for Fourth Amendment purposes.  
Finally, despite years of scholars, judges, and congressional 
committees calling for an overhaul to the immigration adjudica-
tion system,363 none has been forthcoming—if history is any 
guide, these changes are unlikely to occur anytime soon. Magis-
trate judges, however, already exist and regularly decide 
whether there is probable cause to detain. This proposal asks 
that they step in to protect immigration detainees’ Fourth 
Amendment rights. 
 
 358. Russell R. Wheeler, Practical Impediments to Structural Reform and 
the Promise of Third Branch Analytic Methods: A Reply to Professors Baum and 
Legomsky, 59 DUKE L.J. 1847, 1854 (2010); see also AM. BAR ASS’N, supra note 
6, at 6–7 (“A new court or agency would face stiff competition for resources. 
However, the budget for the immigration judiciary would not have to compete 
for funding with other priorities within the same department, as it does now in 
DOJ.”). Yet, as the ABA noted, “the main thrust of most criticisms or doubts 
expressed about an independent court or agency seems to be that it will not 
necessarily solve all of the current problems with the existing system. That, 
however, does not diminish the case for attacking problems that can be ad-
dressed by creating an independent immigration judiciary.” AM. BAR ASS’N, su-
pra note 6, at 6–7 (emphasis in original). 
 359. Lucia v. SEC, 138 S. Ct. 2044 (2018) (holding that administrative law 
judges of the Securities and Exchange Commission are “officers of the United 
States” within the meaning of the Constitution’s Appointments Clause). 
 360. Exec. Order No. 13843, 83 Fed. Reg. 32,755 (July 10, 2018).  
 361. Eric Yoder, Trump Moves To Shield Administrative Law Judge Deci-
sions in Wake of High Court Ruling, WASH. POST (July 10, 2018), https://www 
.washingtonpost.com/news/powerpost/wp/2018/07/10/trump-moves-to-shield 
-administrative-law-judge-decisions-in-wake-of-high-court-ruling/ [https:// 
perma.cc/78F6-7UNP].  
 362. See Legomsky, War on Independence, supra note 6, at 372–74. 
 363. See generally supra note 6 and accompanying text. 
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  CONCLUSION   
The U.S. immigration detention system lacks truly neutral 
judges to authorize months or years of executive detention for 
thousands of people each year. This is precisely the type of legal 
wrong that the Fourth Amendment was designed to prevent. As 
the Court stated in Terry v. Ohio:364 
The scheme of the Fourth Amendment becomes meaningful only when 
it is assured that at some point the conduct of those charged with en-
forcing the laws can be subjected to the more detached, neutral scru-
tiny of a judge who must evaluate the reasonableness of a particular 
search or seizure in light of the particular circumstances.365 
Today, courts have breathed new life into Fourth Amendment 
protections for immigration detainees through the ICE detainer 
litigation. The next round of Fourth Amendment litigation in im-
migration law should resolve a problem that has concerned 
scholars, Congressional committees, lawyers and judges for dec-
ades—the lack of a truly neutral judge. 
 
 
 364. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). 
 365. Id. at 21. 
